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# A Note on Endogenous Control Variables in Evaluation Studies

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## **Abstract**

The paper addresses the issue of potentially endogenous control variables in evaluation studies based on the assumption that selection bias can be avoided by conditioning on observed variables. It shows that the standard formulation of the conditional independence (CIA) or selection on observables assumption obscures the endogeneity problem. The paper clarifies the issue by suggesting a CIA based on exogenous (potential) outcomes as well as explicit exogeneity conditions. The refined CIA allows to assess the endogeneity bias as well as the plausibility of the CIA, because it allows a separate discussion of (i) the problems of missing variables that are necessary to avoid selection bias, and (ii) the problem that some of the control variables may be influenced by the treatment.

## **Keywords**

Evaluation studies, matching methods, conditional independence assumption, endogeneity

## **JEL Classification**

C21, C31

## 1 Introduction

Many evaluation studies of labour market programmes take account of selection effects into the programme by collecting large and informative data with many (control) variables that help to explain participation in the programmes as well as outcome variables of interest. Then, they proceeded with matching methods (see as examples Sianesi, 2004, and Gerfin and Lechner, 2002, among many others) to estimate the effects of the programmes on the specific subgroups of participants and nonparticipants. If conditional on the rich control variables, the participation and the outcome variables are independent, the so-called selection on observables, or conditional independence assumption (CIA) holds. Then, a major condition for the consistency of matching estimators is fulfilled.

However, sometimes, the researcher may not be sure whether the control variables are influenced by the treatment. An example is an unclear timing of the control variables,<sup>1</sup> so that some of them may be actually measured after the treatment. Or they are measured prior to the treatment, but the future treatment start is already known and behaviour changes because of this knowledge. Although there is some notion in the literature that the conditioning variables should not be influenced by the programme participation (not to be confused with the fact that they may be correlated with programme participation), which is spelled out for example in Frangakis and Rubin (2002), Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), Rosenbaum (1984) and Rubin (2004), a clear definition applicable to this case is missing. Strangely, an answer to a simple question like “Does endogeneity of the control variables matter if the CIA holds?” appears to be missing as well.<sup>2</sup>

This note provides an answer to that question ('it does not matter') and defines the exogeneity conditions required for identification. The main thrust of the paper is that the conditional independence assumption based on observable control variables is sometimes a misleading vehicle for discussing

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<sup>1</sup> The 'control' variables are called 'confounding' variables in the statistics literature.

<sup>2</sup> Since in econometrics *endogeneity* is usually a key issue, it is somewhat surprising that it received not much general attention in the field of evaluation studies. The papers in this field concentrated fully on the endogeneity problems coming from missing variables that determine the selection process.

Note that we use the term endogeneity (and exogeneity) somewhat casually for meaning that the variable is (not) influenced by the treatment, which is not exactly in line with the common use of this language in econometrics (e.g.

identification of causal effects in a framework based on potential outcomes. Therefore, I suggest a reformulation of the conditional independence assumption together with explicit exogeneity conditions that allow separating the discussion of selection bias coming from a set of control variables that is not rich enough, from the discussion about their potential endogeneity.

The paper is organised as follows: The next section introduces the notation of the causal model based on potential outcomes and defines the parameters of interest. Section 3 considers the endogeneity problem in the standard formulation of the conditional independence assumption (CIA). Sections 4 and 5 reformulate the standard CIA in terms of potential control variables and characterise the bias as well as the exogeneity assumptions required to avoid it.

## 2 The prototypical binary treatment model

The binary causal model of potential outcomes is currently the workhorse in applied causal analysis. It has its roots in the literature about experimental evaluations in agriculture starting with Neyman (1923).<sup>3</sup> The model is characterised by random variables describing two potential states of the world, also called treatments and denoted by  $S \in \{0, 1\}$  (e.g. participation or nonparticipation in the programme), the corresponding outcome that would occur if one of the states is realised ( $Y^1, Y^0$ ) (e.g. employment status that *would* occur in case of participation and nonparticipation), and the observed outcome variables  $Y$ .<sup>4</sup> Observed and potential outcome variables are related by the observation rule,  $Y = SY^1 + (1 - S)Y^0$ .

Denote characteristics that influence treatment participation as well as potential outcomes as  $X$  (called control variables in econometrics, or confounders in the statistics literature). To address the issue of endogeneity we treat confounders and outcomes in a symmetric way and define random variables for their potential values ( $X^1, X^0$ ), as well as an observation rule  $X = SX^1 + (1 - S)X^0$ . As usual, we

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Engle, Hendry, and Richard, 1983). Alternatively, the exogeneity conditions below may also be termed 'non-causality conditions', although there are different uses for this word as well.

<sup>3</sup> In the following we use the terms common in that literature.

<sup>4</sup> We use the binary model for pedagogical reasons only. The extension to a model with multiple treatments along the lines of Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001, 2002) is straightforward.

are interested in estimating the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET)  $\theta^{10}(1) := E(Y^1 | S = 1) - E(Y^0 | S = 1)$ , the average treatment effect on the nontreated (ATENT)  $\theta^{10}(0) := E(Y^1 | S = 0) - E(Y^0 | S = 0)$  and the average treatment effect (ATE)  $\theta^{10}(\cdot) := E(Y^1) - E(Y^0)$ . Note that  $\theta^{10}(\cdot) = \theta^{10}(1)P(S = 1) + \theta^{10}(0)[1 - P(S = 1)]$ .  $P(S = 1)$  denotes the probability of participation. To complete the model, we follow Rubin (1980) and impose the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA). SUTVA implies that treatments on the individual level are well defined and complete and that there is no interference between treated and controls (e.g. no general equilibrium effects for a labour market training programme). Furthermore, assume that for all values of the observed confounding variables that are of interest ( $x \in \mathcal{X}$ ), there is some chance to end up in either of the two states, i.e.  $0 < P(S = 1 | X = x) < 1$  (common support).

With respect to the data available, assume that there is a random sample of the observable variables  $\{y_i, s_i, x_i\}_{i=1:N}$ , that is large enough so that studying identification in the population instead of the sample is reasonable. Nevertheless,  $E(Y^1 | S = 0)$ ,  $E(Y^0 | S = 1)$ ,  $E(Y^1)$ , and  $E(Y^0)$ , are not identified without further assumptions.

### 3 Is there an endogeneity problem when the conditional independence assumption holds?

Assume that ‘the data are informative enough, so that controlling for observed variables is sufficient to remove any selection bias’ (Rubin, 1974, 1977, 1979). This is the so-called conditional independence (CIA) or selection on observables assumption. It is formalised as:

$$Y^1, Y^0 \perp\!\!\!\perp S | X = x, \quad \forall x \in \mathcal{X}. \quad (\text{CIA-O})$$

$\perp\!\!\!\perp$  denotes conditional independence as in Dawid (1979). CIA-O implies  $F(Y^s | S = 1-s, X = x) = F(Y^s | S = s, X = x)$ ,  $s \in \{0, 1\}$ . It allows to identify the treatment effects because  $E(Y^s | S = 1-s) = E_{X|S=1-s} E(Y^s | S = 1-s, X = x) = E_{X|S=1-s} E(Y^s | S = s, X = x) = E_{X|S=1-s} E(Y | S = s, X = x)$ .

Other than some standard regularity assumptions about the existence of moments, no further assumptions, in particular, *no assumptions* about the exogeneity of the control variables are required. Therefore, the question arises what happens if some of the control variables are influenced by the treatment (i.e.  $X^1 \neq X^0$ ). At this level, the answer is that *it does not matter* at all, as long as (CIA-O) is satisfied. This seems to be odd at first glance, because it is a well known fact that endogenous control variables may lead to tremendous biases of the resulting estimators. For example, suppose the chosen estimator is a pair matching estimator<sup>5</sup> and the observed outcome variable is included among the control variable, then matched pairs have the same value of the outcome variable and the estimators will always give a zero as estimated treatment effect, whatever the true effect may be.

To resolve this puzzle, note that with an endogenous variable included among the control variables, the untestable assumption CIA may become hard to defend on a priori grounds. Using the observation rule for the confounders, we see the reason: CIA implies  $F(Y^s | S = 1 - s, X^{1-s} = x) = F(Y^s | S = s, X^s = x)$ . In this case the randomization interpretation of CIA ('if we observe all variables jointly influencing outcome and selection, then, conditional on the same value of these variables, selection is random') does not hold any longer, because the comparison relates to the same value, but for different control variables. Since we cannot observe  $X^1$  for nonparticipants et vice versa, we must condition on the observed  $X$ . However, conditioning on the observed  $X$  implies conditioning on  $X^1$  for the participants, and conditioning on  $X^0$  for the nonparticipants. This could be a problem, whenever  $X^1$  and  $X^0$  are not the same.

To conclude, endogeneity of the control variables does not play any role once CIA is assumed, but it makes CIA unlikely to hold. Thus, the endogeneity problem is obscured when stipulating CIA in the usual way as in CIA-O.

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<sup>5</sup> See Imbens (2004) for an extensive survey of relevant estimation methods.



## 4 The explicit treatment of endogeneity

This section discusses potential biases due to endogeneity of the control variables (i.e. they are influenced by the treatment) and gives conditions under which no such biases occur. Such variables may contain valuable information about the selection process as considered in Rosenbaum (1984), they may be in the 'causal pathway' of the treatment, as in Rubin (2005), or they may be intermediate outcomes of a dynamic treatment not yet completed (Lechner and Miquel, 2005).

First, I restate the conditional independence assumption conditioning on variables that are by definition exogenous, namely the potential confounders:

$$Y^1, Y^0 \perp\!\!\!\perp S \mid X^s = x, \quad \forall x \in \mathcal{X}, \quad (\text{CIA-P})$$

$s$  is either 0 or 1. CIA-P implies  $F(Y^s \mid S = 1-s, X^s = x) = F(Y^s \mid S = s, X^s = x)$  for all values of  $s$ . Since this condition is a contrast for the same conditioning variables, the requirement truly is that if all variables influencing outcomes and selection are included in  $X^s$ , CIA-P must hold. A natural choice for  $X^s$  in applications would be  $X^0$  that can probably be measured prior to the treatment, whereas  $X^1$  is typically unknown, or at least uncertain. Conceptionally, it does not matter whether  $X^0$  or  $X^1$  is included. Including both potential outcomes,  $X^0$  and  $X^1$ , simultaneously would suggest that people select on their gains / effects, which would be a significant deviation of the assumptions commonly used in applications. However, if the gains are uncertain at the time of the treatment decision it is sufficient to include in  $X^0$  the relevant information set that is used to predict individual gains. Note, that CIA-P does not allow identification of the effects. There must be additional assumptions linking the potential  $X$  to the observed  $X$ . Of course, for the strongest of such assumptions, i.e. that  $S$  has not influence on  $X$  at all,  $X = X^1 = X^0$ , CIA-P and CIA-O are identical. In fact, they are identical to what Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) call the assumption of *strongly ignorable treatment assignment*.

## 4.1 Bias

Next, consider the potential bias for the counterfactuals using the identification strategy outlined in the previous section. Using the observation rule for outcomes and control variables together with CIA-P, the bias can be characterised. The characterisation depends on whether the potential outcome and potential confounders relate to the same or a different potential state. For the same state, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \underbrace{E(Y^s | S = 1-s) - \frac{E}{X|S=1-s} E(Y | S = s, X = x)}_{\text{Bias}} &= \frac{E}{X^s|S=1-s} E(Y^s | S = 1-s, X^s = x) - \frac{E}{X^{1-s}|S=1-s} E(Y | S = s, X = x) \\
 &= \frac{E}{X^s|S=1-s} E(Y | S = s, X^s = x) - \frac{E}{X^{1-s}|S=1-s} E(Y | S = s, X = x) \\
 &= \frac{E}{X^s|S=1-s} E(Y | S = s, X = x) - \frac{E}{X^{1-s}|S=1-s} E(Y | S = s, X = x).
 \end{aligned}$$

The bias arises because  $X^1$  and  $X^0$  may have different distributions in the population of interest ( $I-s$ ). If  $F(X^1 | S = 1-s) = F(X^0 | S = 1-s)$  [ $= F(X | S = 1-s)$ ], the bias is zero. This is an exogeneity condition, because it stipulates that the distribution of the controls is not affected by the treatment in a specific subpopulation. For example, if interest is in ATET ( $\theta^{10}(1)$ ) and conditioning is on  $X^0$ , then this is all what is needed for identification.

In the other case, when potential outcome and potential confounders relate to different states, a similar expression arises, which differs however in an important aspect:

$$\begin{aligned}
 E(Y^{1-s} | S = s) - \frac{E}{X|S=s} E(Y | S = 1-s, X = x) &= \frac{E}{X^s|S=s} E(Y^{1-s} | S = s, X^s = x) - \frac{E}{X|S=s} E(Y | S = 1-s, X = x) \\
 &= \frac{E}{X^s|S=s} E(Y | S = 1-s, X^s = x) - \frac{E}{X|S=s} E(Y | S = 1-s, X = x) \\
 &= \frac{E}{X|S=s} [E(Y | S = 1-s, X^s = x) - E(Y | S = 1-s, X = x)].
 \end{aligned}$$

In this case the bias arises because we should evaluate the first conditional expectation of  $Y$  as a function of the counterfactual conditioning variable, instead of the observed one. Thus, if both expectations coincide, i.e.  $E(Y | S = s, X^{1-s} = x) = E(Y | S = s, X^s = x)$ , then no bias arises. This is again an exogeneity condition in a specific subpopulation, although somewhat weaker than the previous one. It stipulates that the  $X$  may be influenced by the treatment, but these influences should not matter for the outcomes.

## 4.2 Identification under explicit exogeneity conditions

The previous considerations suggest explicitly introducing the following two exogeneity conditions:

$$F(X^s | S = 1 - s) = F(X^{1-s} | S = 1 - s); \quad (\text{E.1})$$

$$E(Y | S = s, X^{1-s} = x) = E(Y | S = s, X^s = x). \quad (\text{E.2})$$

$\theta^{s,1-s}(\cdot)$  is identified if CIA-P, E.1 and E.2 hold. If interest is in  $\theta^{s,1-s}(s)$  only, then only *CIA-P* (for  $Y^{1-s}$ ) and *E.1* is required, whereas *CIA-P* (for  $Y^s$ ) and *E.2* identify  $\theta^{s,1-s}(1-s)$ .<sup>6</sup> Therefore, for ATE CIA-P, E.1 and E.2 are required. The proofs follow directly from the expressions of the biases given above. If the treatment does not influence the control variables at all ( $X^1 = X^0$ ), E.1 and E.2 hold trivially. Note that together with the two exogeneity conditions, CIA-P implies CIA-O, et vice versa. However, without those exogeneity conditions, neither implies the other.

It is interesting to compare the exogeneity conditions suggested above to conditions already considered in the literature. Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) require  $F(X | Y^1, Y^0, S) = F(X | Y^1, Y^0)$  to hold. From our considerations above, this condition is neither necessary nor sufficient. When used together with CIA based on observables (which is of course unnecessary for identification), it has however some intuitive appeal, because it rules out some dependence of the observed  $X$  on  $S$ .

The early paper by Rosenbaum (1984) considers a formal framework in which the endogeneity comes from some variables affected by the treatment that are, however, not necessary as control variables for the CIA. Thus, his question is about the potential damage when such variables are included in the conditioning set. His sufficient conditions for no selection bias imposes  $X^1 = X^0$ . Thus, it seems to be stronger than necessary.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Note that CIA-P, E.1 and E.2 need only hold for one specific value of  $s$  (0 or 1). It must, however, be the same in all three conditions.

<sup>7</sup> Due to the specific framework he uses, he must impose a further condition that amounts to a 'no selection bias conditional on X assumption' for the affected conditioning variables as well.

The idea to condition on potential confounders is similar to an idea advanced in papers by Frangakis and Rubin (2002) and Rubin (2004). The aim of these authors is to arrive at valid results for the effects despite the endogeneity problem of the controls. They define what they call *principle strata* of the data. These strata are defined by the values of the potential confounding variables. They ‘solve’ the problem that such strata are inherently unobservable by, firstly, estimating the values for the potentially endogenous control variables. Then, they use the estimated values of the potential control variables as control variables in the final estimation. This method is computationally and conceptionally attractive, but it hinges on the ability to predict the individual values of these controls consistently. On top of other assumptions, this poses a new identification problem that may be as difficult to solve - convincingly - as the original one.

## 5 Conclusion

This paper showed that the fact that some control variables may be influenced by the treatment does not matter as long as the usual formulation of the conditional independence assumption holds. In other words, the usual formulation of the CIA obscures this endogeneity problem. Therefore, an alternative formulation of the conditional independence assumption together with explicit exogeneity conditions is proposed. The new conditions allow separating the discussion of eliminating selection bias by conditioning on the necessary control variables, from the discussion about their potential endogeneity with respect to outcome and selection variables. Thus, these conditions should provide useful and in fact better guidance for applied work, in particular for the assessment of the plausibility of the untestable assumptions that are always required for the identification of causal effects.

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