



Universität St.Gallen

Identification of the Effects of Dynamic Treatments by Sequential Conditional Independence Assumptions

Michael Lechner and Ruth Miquel

August 2005 Discussion Paper no. 2005-17

Editor:

Prof. Jörg Baumberger
University of St. Gallen
Department of Economics
Bodanstr. 1
CH-9000 St. Gallen
Phone +41 71 224 22 41
Fax +41 71 224 28 85
Email joerg.baumberger@unisg.ch

Publisher:

Department of Economics
University of St. Gallen
Bodanstrasse 8
CH-9000 St. Gallen
Phone +41 71 224 23 25
Fax +41 71 224 22 98

Electronic Publication:

<http://www.vwa.unisg.ch>

Identification of the Effects of Dynamic Treatments by Sequential Conditional Independence Assumptions¹

Michael Lechner and Ruth Miquel

Author's address: Prof. Michael Lechner, Dr. Ruth Miquel
Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied
Economic Research (SIAW)
Bodanstrasse 8
CH-9000 St. Gallen
Tel. ++41 71 224 23 40
Fax ++41 71 224 22 98
Email michael.lechner@unisg.ch, ruth.miquel@unisg.ch
Website www.siaw.unisg.ch/lechner

¹ First version: "A Potential Outcome Approach to Dynamic Programme Evaluation: Nonparametric Identification", May 2001; revised: August 2005

Abstract

This paper approaches the causal analysis of sequences of interventions from a potential outcome perspective. The identifying power of several different assumptions concerning the connection between the dynamic selection process and the outcomes of different sequences is discussed. The assumptions invoke different randomisation assumptions which are compatible with different selection regimes. Parametric forms are not involved. When participation in the sequences is decided every period depending on its success so far, the resulting endogeneity problem destroys non-parametric identification for many parameters of interest. However, some interesting dynamic forms of the average treatment effect are identified. As an empirical example for the application of this approach, we reexamine the effects of training programmes for the unemployed in West Germany.

Keywords

Dynamic treatment regimes, nonparametric identification, causal effects, sequential randomisation, programme evaluation, treatment effects, dynamic matching, panel data.

JEL Classification

C21, C31

Introduction*

The empirical and methodological literature on econometric programme evaluation places great emphasis on learning causal effects of economic interventions from empirical correlations by understanding selection processes. Many recent contributions to this literature explicitly use a 'causal model' of potential outcomes that is typically associated with Neyman (1923), Wilks (1932), Roy (1951), Cochran and Chambers (1965), and Rubin (1974). This type of causal inference relates to the question of what would happen in one hypothetical situation (e.g. participating in a training programme) compared to another situation (e.g. not participating in such a programme).¹ The static treatment model - the workhorse of empirical evaluation studies - is very explicit about problems and possible solutions of selective treatment participation. It allows the derivation of exciting results with respect to nonparametric identification and robust estimation.² It is, however, silent about what to do if selection occurs while the treatment is already in progress (dropout). It is also not helpful to handle selection problems that occur during a sequence of treatments when interest is in the effect of the full sequence.

* Michael Lechner has further affiliations with CEPR, London, ZEW, Mannheim, IZA, Bonn, and PSI, London. Financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (grants 4043-058311 and 4045-050673) and the IAB, Nuremberg (grants 6-531A and 6-531A.1), is gratefully acknowledged. We presented previous drafts of this paper at seminars and workshops at the Universities of Cambridge, Juan Carlos III Madrid, Geneva, and Strasbourg, at INSEE-CREST, Paris, at IFAU in Uppsala, at ESEM 2001 in Lausanne, at EC² 2002 in Louvain-la-Neuve, and at the annual meeting of the econometrics section of the German Economic Association 2002 in Rauschholzhausen. We thank participants for helpful comments. We also very much appreciate comments by Bruno Crépon, Bernd Fitzenberger, Guido Imbens, Jim Heckman, and Jeff Smith, as well as of two anonymous referees and an associate editor of this journal. They helped to improve and simplify a previous version of the paper considerably. All remaining errors are our own.

¹ To stick to the terminology of this literature with strong links to statistics and biometrics, we use the term *treatment* from now on as a substitute for *programme* or *intervention* or similar terms.

² Examples are papers by Imbens and Angrist (1994) for the identifying power of instrumental variables, Heckman and Vytlacil (2006) and Vytlacil (2002) for nonparametric selection models, and Rubin (1977) for the conditional independence assumption. Furthermore, see the comprehensive surveys by Heckman and Robb (1985), Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), and Imbens (2004), as well as the textbook by Cameron and Trivedi (2005).

As an example, consider the problem of evaluating individual labour market effects of active labour market policies that may consist of training and employment programmes for the unemployed. In many countries that use such policies, unemployed participate in a sequence of programmes, instead of only one programme. For example, an unemployed person is assisted with job search. If she remains unemployed, then she is sent to a training programme. If she remains unemployed, then she participates in an employment programme, and so on.³ Usually, the effects of the programmes, in which the individual participated so far, influence the next programme participation (or her attrition from the planned programme sequence). Obviously, any static causal framework needs many simplifying assumptions to be able to even define the interesting questions, not to mention the ability to discuss identification of causal parameters of interest.

Formulating an explicit dynamic treatment framework has the advantage that questions relating to the definition of parameters and selection biases that occur while the treatment (the sequence) is in operation can be addressed directly and formulated in a natural way. Thus, we can derive explicitly the conditions required to identify such parameters from experimental and non-experimental data by allowing for dynamic selection processes that depend on the success of the treatment received so far. This type of selection comes on top of the usual 'static' selection process in operation when deciding which treatment sequences to start with. Its dependence on the intermediate outcomes of the treatment complicates identification of the causal effects. This type of endogeneity bias is the key issue we tackle in this paper.⁴

Recently, several authors have addressed dynamic causal issues by using ad-hoc modifications of the static causal framework. For example, Bergemann, Fitzenberger, and Speckesser (2004) evaluate training programme sequences, Lechner (1999) and Sianesi (2004) propose procedures to deal with participants entering labour market programmes at different points in their unemployment spell (different 'waiting

³ Similar issues arise when the start dates of the programmes vary individually, when there are different programme durations, or in any combination of such dynamic phenomena.

⁴ See the papers by Rosenbaum (1984), Rubin (2004, 2005) and Lechner (2005) on how the fact that control variables are influenced by the treatment (endogeneity of control variables) may bias the usual estimators used in the static evaluation framework.

times'). In a related setting, Crépon and Kramarz (2002) use different 'start times' to analyse the effects of the introduction of a policy to reduce standard working hours in France. A similar problem is the issue of programme duration as analysed by Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd (2005) in the context of a school subsidy experiment. Because these papers use static models of potential outcomes, it is difficult to define the desired causal effect in a way such that the impact of the (implicit) assumptions about the dynamic selection process on the estimand becomes apparent.⁵

Applications of the explicit dynamic causal framework based on potential outcomes are very rare in econometrics so far. Ding and Lehrer (2003) use the framework suggested in this paper and related work by Miquel (2002, 2003) to evaluate a sequentially randomised class size study using difference-in-difference-type estimation methods. The paper by Lechner (2004) takes the identification results of this paper, suggests different estimators, subjects them to a Monte Carlo study and applies some of them to Swiss labour market data.

In epidemiology and biostatistics there is a related literature that uses dynamic counterfactual outcomes explicitly (e.g. Robins, 1986, 1989, 1997, 1999, Robins, Greenland, and Hu, 1999, for discrete treatments; Gill and Robins, 2001 for continuous treatments) to define the effect of treatments in discrete time. Identification is achieved by sequential randomisation assumptions (see the very comprehensible summary by Abbring, 2003). The effects are typically estimated using parametric models. There is also a similarity to

⁵ There are further connections to other strands of econometrics: For example, the literature on dynamic panel data models identified by sequential moment conditions (e.g. Chamberlain, 1987, 1992) and this approach are related. In a previous version of this paper, we show that W-DCIA and S-DCIA, the type of sequential selection on observables assumption exploited below, do not identify the coefficients of such models. Identification of the coefficients is only possible with additional assumptions. These assumptions are not necessary to achieve identification of the causal effects, though. Furthermore, the causal effects do not correspond to any of the coefficients usually estimated in such models. Another connection is with the literature on social learning. In particular, Manski (2004) is concerned with dynamic selection problems from one cohort to the next. However, he assumes that the outcome distribution is stationary over time, which is in sharp contrast to our modelling of the outcomes. Therefore, in his framework, as time goes by more information is revealed about the same counterfactual outcome distribution and social learning can be regarded as a process of reducing ambiguity resulting from the selection process. In our framework in which there is no stationarity, the uncertainty does not necessarily decrease over time.

Murphy (2003). She proposes estimators for optimal treatment rules that specify how the treatment changes over time depending on how covariates change.

We formulate an explicit dynamic causal model and discuss conditions for identifying different causal parameters. Similar to Robins and co-authors we find that observing the information set that influences the allocation to the next treatment in a treatment sequence as well as the outcome of interest is sufficient to nonparametrically identify average treatment effects (dynamic ATE - DATE) even if this information is influenced by the past of the treatment sequence going on. We call this assumption the weak dynamic conditional independence assumption (W-DCIA), or alternatively, sequential selection on observables. On the more negative side, we show that this assumption is not sufficient to identify the parameter most commonly estimated in the static framework, namely the treatment effect on the treated (Dynamic ATET - DATET), i.e. the effect of the two different sequences for the subpopulation of those participating in one of the sequences. The reason is that the subpopulation of interest (the participants who complete the sequence) has evolved (been selected) based on the realised intermediate outcomes of the sequence. We show that W-DCIA must be strengthened by imposing (exogeneity) conditions on the joint distribution of potential outcomes and conditioning variables to obtain identification of DATET (strong DCIA). Intuitively, this assumption (S-DCIA), rules out any influence of intermediate outcomes on the selection process in the future.

Furthermore, we argue that the formulation that is based on observed control variables partly obscures the endogeneity problem. Therefore, we propose alternative formulations of the W-DCIA and the S-DCIA that clarify the exogeneity conditions needed for the control variables.

We show as well that identification can not only be achieved by conditioning directly on the appropriate control variables, but also by using functions of these control variables instead. Thus, the functions are so-called balancing scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984). They show considerable similarity to the propensity scores frequently used in (static) empirical evaluation studies that use conditional independence assumptions for identification.

We very briefly show the structure of the estimation problem and point out that suitably adjusted matching estimators can be used (see Lechner, 2004) instead of the parametric procedures suggested by Robins and co-authors for their related model.

The following section outlines the general setup of our empirical example which is concerned with the evaluation of German training programmes for unemployed and based on a large administrative database. We use this example in all later sections to clarify ideas and to show the usefulness and feasibility of our approach in applied work. In Section 3 we define the notation as well as the effects of interest in a dynamic treatment setting. Section 4 proposes identification strategies that are based on sequentially applying conditional independence assumptions and discusses their identifying power for the effects defined in Section 3. Section 5 briefly sketches possible estimation procedures and proposes balancing scores that could be helpful in empirical applications. Section 6 contains the results for the empirical example and Section 7 summarises our main findings and concludes. Appendices A and B contain proofs for the theorems and lemmas stated in the main part of the paper. Finally, additional material concerning the details of the empirical application is available on the internet and can be download at www.siaaw.unisg.ch/lechner/lm_2005.

2 Empirical example: Government sponsored training in West Germany

Germany runs a considerable active labour market policy to combat its high unemployment. In this example we concentrate on the training part of the policy in West Germany. Between 1991 and 1997, West Germany spent about 3.6 bn Euro per year on such training programmes. Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2004, LMW in the following) evaluate the effects of the different training programmes. More precisely, they evaluate the effects of beginning the first programme participation spell in 1993 or 1994 based on an informative new administrative database. LMW find that the programmes have different short-term and long-term effects. However, the causal effects they are estimating neither control for dropout nor include additional effects of subsequent programme participation.

We use the same administrative data as LMW and refer the reader to LMW and the internet appendix for more details concerning the data. We focus on a subsample of individuals who enter unemployment between January 1992 and December 1993 and receive unemployment benefits or unemployment assistance. It is the first month of unemployment within this window that we define as period zero - our reference period. We are interested in comparing three different types of treatments: (i) remaining unemployed and receiving benefits and services from the employment offices (denoted by U); (ii) participating in a vocational training programme paid for by the employment office (T); and (iii) participating in a retraining programme paid for by the employment office (R , the aim of such programmes is to obtain a vocational degree in a different occupation). Since in the data there is not enough variation over time to analyse monthly movements in and out of R and T , we aggregate the monthly information into quarterly information. We are interested in the effects of participating for four quarters in different types of programmes ($TTTT$ vs. $RRRR$). Furthermore, we consider the effects of participating in either of those programmes compared to remaining in open unemployed ($TTTT$ vs. $UUUU$, $RRRR$ vs. $UUUU$).⁶ Our outcome of interest is whether the individual is employed two, respectively four, years later.

Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for selected variables. The statistics give an indication about differences over time as well as across subsamples defined by treatment status (note that e.g. $UUUU$ is a subsample of UUU , which is a subsample of UU , which is a subsample of U).

----- Table 1 about here -----

It is important to distinguish two types of variables, those that are time constant and, thus, can not be influenced by the treatment (but may influence selection decisions), and those that are time varying and may be influenced by the treatment. The first panel gives some examples of such variables (like age, sex,

⁶ There are many other effects that could be defined and estimated using this framework, like the effect of entering programmes at different times (e.g. $UTTT$ compared to $TTTT$, or $UTTT-TTT$), like the effect of different lengths of programmes (e.g. $T-TTTT$, $TU-TTTT$, etc.) but for the sake of brevity they will be discussed elsewhere. Note that in our application there is an additional state beginning in period 2 which is defined by neither participating in the programmes nor being registered as unemployed (i.e. anything else that is not covered by the sequences of interest).

nationality). The remaining parts of this table contain examples of time varying variables, like the receipt of unemployment benefits, earnings and the remaining claim to unemployment benefits. Note that time variation in some earnings and particular unemployment benefit claim variables is generated by short interruptions of the unemployment spell as well as by specific events within the unemployment spell, like training or benefit sanctions. There is additional information about education, position in last job, last occupation, industrial sector, region, and information about the last employer (sector, size), employment and unemployment histories and benefit entitlement.

The sample is dominated by about 27,000 unemployed in the first quarter. 19,500 of them are coded as receiving unemployment benefits every quarter (and did not participate in *R* or *T*). A similar decline is observed for vocational training (*T*) that has a mean duration below one year ($500 \rightarrow 120$), whereas the number of participants in retraining (*R*) with a mean duration of almost two years remains fairly stable ($175 \rightarrow 150$).

The first three columns reveal some information about the initial selection into the treatments. We see that the main differences occur with respect to age (the nonparticipants are 4 - 8 years older on average) and had higher earnings and higher remaining benefit claims (both positively correlated with age) before getting unemployed. Over time the older unemployed are more likely to remain unemployed, thus those remaining unemployed over one year are on average five years older than those who are unemployed in the first period. Similar changes over time do not occur with the other groups. The raw estimates, i.e. unadjusted for any differences in observable covariates, of the employment impacts four years later suggest a large positive effect of training and retraining compared to unemployment ($TTTT - UUUU = 39\%$; $RRRR - UUUU = 52\%$) and a positive effect of at least one year of retraining compared to at least one year of training of about 13%. In Section 6 we present the results that correct for selection effects and will find that the effects are generally smaller for the comparison with unemployment and more in favour of *RRRR* when compared to *TTTT*.

A more sophisticated way to analyse differences in covariates in the different subsamples is to use sequential binary probit analyse, using as covariates time-constant and predetermined time-varying variables

(with their full history across the quarters) that may be considered to influence selection in each step of each sequence as well as the outcome variables. Table 2 shows the results of these probits for selected variables (see the Internet Appendix for the results using all covariates and, the standard errors). Note that there is one specification for every transition we are interested in, therefore Table 2 displays results for 12 probits. The specification is intended to be similar across different programmes. However, in some cases (typically related to *R*, a programme with not much dropout and not much variation in the planned programme duration), there is not much variation in the dependent variable. For example, 164 observations are observed in *RRR*, of which only 15 do not appear in *RRRR*. In these cases, drastically fewer variables are used as independent variables in the respective probit estimation.

----- Table 2 about here -----

The table shows many variables influencing the different transitions in a statistically significant way. The coefficients seem to confirm the impressions obtained from the descriptive statistics discussed above. Since history of the time-varying variables is included in all specifications (for reasons that will become apparent after the next section), some multicollinearity problems appear. They either lead to alternating signs of coefficients for different lags of these variables (in the case of *U*) or lead to serious instability or break down of the estimation for some variables in *T*. In case of breakdown, some of the variables are omitted. Finally, note that due to small movement over time for retraining, it appears to be hard to find significant variables for these transitions (other than the constant term), which suggests that selection bias conditional on having chosen *R* in the first period, is a minor issue for *RR*, *RRR* and *RRRR*.

3 The dynamic model of potential outcomes: notation

3.1 The variables

In the previous section we have outline the general setup for the formal causal framework to be introduced here based on a model with three types of treatments that could occur in four different periods plus the initial period 0 in which everybody became unemployed (as would be quite usual in applications). To

focus ideas, however, we will develop the formal model for the 'minimal' case of two treatments and two periods, only (to compare TT vs. RR in our example). Although, the necessary extension is not entirely trivial, the key ideas become apparent with this stylised version.⁷

Consider a world with an initial period in which everybody is in the same treatment state (U in our example), plus two subsequent periods in which different treatment states are realised. The periods are indexed by t or τ ($t, \tau \in \{0, 1, 2\}$). The treatment received by members of the population is described by a vector of random variables $S = (S_0, S_1, S_2)$.⁸ Later on, for notational convenience, the initial period is not mentioned explicitly. Starting in period 1, S_t can take two values (e.g. T or R). A particular realisation of S_t is denoted by $s_t \in \{0, 1\}$. Furthermore, denote the history of variables up to period t by a bar below a variable, i.e. $\underline{s}_2 = (0, s_1, s_2)$ (e.g. URR).⁹ In period 1, a member of the population can be observed in exactly one of two treatments. In period 2, she participates in one of four treatment sequences $((0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1))$, depending on what happened in period 1. This notation allows us to specify shorter (partial) sequences by considering effects of sequences s_1 instead of \underline{s}_2 . Therefore, every individual 'belongs' to exactly one sequence defined by s_1 and another sequence defined by \underline{s}_2 . To sum up, in the three-periods-two-treatments example we consider six different overlapping potential outcomes corresponding to two mutually exclusive states defined by treatment status in period 1 (e.g. T, R), plus four mutually exclusive states defined by treatment status in period 1 and 2 together (e.g. TT, TR, RT, RR), thus allowing us to evaluate treatments of different lengths.

⁷ The notation and most of the proofs for the general model are contained in a previous discussion paper version of this paper that can be downloaded from the website of the authors.

⁸ We avoid the technical term *units* for members of the population. Given our motivating application, we call them *individuals* instead. Generally, the notational setup in this section follows the spirit of Rubin (1974) and others.

⁹ To differentiate between different sequences, sometimes a letter (e.g. j) is used to index a sequence like \underline{s}_t^j . Furthermore, since all sequences are identical for the base period, we ignore that period in the following when denoting different sequences. As a further convention, capital letters usually denote random variables, whereas small letters denote specific values of the random variable. When we deviate from this convention, it will be obvious.

Variables used to measure the effects of the treatment, i.e. the potential outcomes, are indexed by treatments and denoted by $Y_t^{\underline{s}}$ (e.g. employment two or four years after the beginning of unemployment). Potential outcomes are measured at the end of (or just after) each period, whereas treatment status is measured in the beginning of each period. For each length of a sequence (1 or 2 periods), one of the potential outcomes is observable and denoted by Y_t . The resulting two observation rules are defined in equation (1):¹⁰

$$Y_t = S_1 Y_t^1 + (1 - S_1) Y_t^0 = S_1 S_2 Y_t^{11} + S_1 (1 - S_2) Y_t^{10} + (1 - S_1) S_2 Y_t^{01} + (1 - S_1) (1 - S_2) Y_t^{00}; \quad t = 0, 1, 2, \dots \quad (1)$$

In words, for those who participated in training in the first period, we observe Y_t^T . For those remaining in training for two periods, we observe Y_t^{TT} . It remains to define variables that may influence treatment selection and (or) potential outcomes, often called *attributes* or *confounders*, denoted by X . Because we do not rule out that treatment status influences the values of these variables (introducing some *endogeneity* to be defined below), there are potential values of these variables ($X^{\underline{s}} = (X_0^{\underline{s}}, X_1^{\underline{s}})$). $X_t^{\underline{s}}$ may contain $Y_t^{\underline{s}}$ or functions of it. The K -dimensional vector X_t is observable at the same time as Y_t . The corresponding observation rule for X_t is analogous to the one for the potential outcomes given in equation (1).

3.2 The effects

The purpose of the intended empirical analysis is to estimate the mean causal effect denoted by $\theta_t^{s^k, \underline{s}^l}$ ($t \geq \tau$) in period t of a sequence of treatments defined up to period 1 or 2 (or further) (s_1^k or \underline{s}_2^k), e.g. T

¹⁰ The observation rule is part of Robins' so-called *consistency condition* (e.g. Robins, 1997). In our notation his *consistency condition* implies $X_1 = S_1 X_1^1 + (1 - S_1) X_1^0 = S_1 X_1^{11} + (1 - S_1) X_1^{01} = S_1 X_1^{10} + (1 - S_1) X_1^{00}$, which also entails a substantial restriction / assumption in the form of a 'no anticipation condition', like $X_1^1 = X_1^{11}$, which is not required for our observation rule.

or TT , compared to another sequence of the same length (s_1^l or s_2^l), e.g. R or RR . For notational convenience, we consider only pair-wise effects of sequences having the same length. Effects may be heterogeneous across participants in different sequences. For obvious reasons, we are only interested in subpopulations defined by treatment status not specified beyond the last period of the specified treatment sequence. In other words, we do not consider the effects of the treatment in period 1 for the population of participants in a treatment sequence defined for periods 1 and 2.

The definition of the average causal effects is given in equation (2):

$$\theta_t^{s_\tau^k:s_\tau^l}(s_\tau^j) := E(Y_t^{s_\tau^k} | \underline{s}_\tau = \underline{s}_\tau^j) - E(Y_t^{s_\tau^l} | \underline{s}_\tau = \underline{s}_\tau^j),$$

$$0 \leq \tilde{\tau} \leq 2, \quad 1 \leq \tau \leq 2, \quad \tilde{\tau} \leq \tau, \quad k \neq l, \quad k, l \in (1, \dots, 2^\tau), \quad j \in (1, \dots, 2^{\tilde{\tau}}). \quad (2)$$

In our examples, if we were interested in the effect of two periods of retraining compared to training in the first period and retraining in the second period for those participating in retraining in both periods on the outcome in period 3, we denote this effect as $\theta_3^{TT:RT}(RR)$. If the relevant subpopulation consists only of those receiving retraining in period 1, then $\theta_3^{TT:RT}(R)$ is the relevant parameter. For $\tilde{\tau} = 0$, we obtain the average effect for the population (which is defined by their status in period 0), e.g. $\theta_3^{TT:RT}$.¹¹ To interpret $\theta_t^{s_\tau^k:s_\tau^l}(s_\tau^j)$ as a causal effect, the standard assumptions of the potential outcome framework, like the Rubin (1974) Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) have to be invoked as well. They imply that the effects of treatment on person i does not depend on the treatment choices of other people.

There is a close resemblance of the effects defined in equation (2) to effects that are typically of interest in the static evaluation literature, namely the average treatment effect (ATE, e.g. $\theta_3^{T,R}$) and the ATE on the treated (ATET, e.g. $\theta_3^{T,R}(T)$). Here, we call $\theta_t^{s_\tau^k:s_\tau^l}$ the dynamic average treatment effect (DATE).

¹¹ All of what follows is also valid in strata defined by the attributes.

Accordingly, $\theta_t^{\underline{s}^k:\underline{s}^l}(\underline{s}^k)$, e.g. $\theta_3^{TT,RT}(TT)$, as well as $\theta_t^{\underline{s}^k:\underline{s}^l}(\underline{s}^l)$, e.g. $\theta_3^{TT,RT}(RT)$ are termed DATE on the treated (DATET) and DATE on the nontreated.¹² There are cases in-between, like $\theta_t^{\underline{s}^k:\underline{s}^l}(\underline{s}^l)$, e.g. $\theta_3^{TT,RT}(R)$, for which the conditioning set is defined by a sequence shorter than the ones that are evaluated. Furthermore, note that the effects are symmetric in the sense of $\theta_t^{\underline{s}^k:\underline{s}^l}(\underline{s}^j) = -\theta_t^{\underline{s}^l:\underline{s}^k}(\underline{s}^j)$, but also that $\theta_t^{\underline{s}^k:\underline{s}^l}(\underline{s}^k) \neq -\theta_t^{\underline{s}^l:\underline{s}^k}(\underline{s}^l)$. The appendix provides results concerning the connection of effects defined for different lengths of treatments and conditioning sets.

----- Figure 1 about here -----

----- Table 3 about here -----

Table 3 and Figure 1 summarise the notation as well as the definitions introduced so far, whereas Figure 1 clarifies the timing of the different potential and observable variables, as well as how they relate to the potential treatment paths. To understand the effect of the latter is the ultimate goal of an evaluation exercise based on a dynamic causal framework.

To simplify our notational burden and increase readability of the paper, we will not consider comparisons for which our dynamic approach does not provide any new insights, because they are essentially static. These include all comparisons for a treatment specified over one period only, as well as those comparisons of sequences that are defined for two periods but for which the first period coincides for the two sequences as well as the population under investigation, like $\theta_3^{TT,TR}(T)$.

3.3 Sampling and regularity conditions

To complete our framework, assume that a large random sample $\{s_{1i}, s_{2i}, x_{0i}, x_{1i}, x_{2i}, y_{1i}, y_{2i}\}_{i=1:N}$ is at our disposal, drawn from a large population of participants in $S_0 = 0$. This population is characterised by the

¹² Note that our approach can be used to capture an additional year for some programme compared to some alternative, like $\theta_3^{TT,RT}(RT)$. Behrman, Cheng, and Todd (2004) call such effects ‘marginal effects’.

corresponding random variables $(S_1, S_2, X_0, X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2)$. Furthermore, all conditional expectations that are of interest in the remainder of this paper shall exist. Taken together these assumptions allow us to phrase the questions of identification of the causal parameters as to whether we are able to express the various expectations of the potential outcomes in terms of expectations of observable outcomes which, in principle, can be estimated consistently.

4 Identification of the effects of dynamic treatment regimes

4.1 Introduction

We showed in the previous section that the data alone cannot identify the effects. Like with any causal model based on potential outcomes, there are three general routes to identification. The first option is to choose a particular parametric specification (up to a finite number of unknown parameters) of the joint distribution of the potential outcome and selection variables conditional on attributes. A major criticism of this approach is that, usually, particular specifications are hard to rationalise with behavioural, institutional, and data related arguments, in particular when they are not a result of a structural behavioural model.

Most of the modern evaluation literature focuses on nonparametric identification (e.g. Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). Within this group, there are two different approaches. The first one relies on having access to variables that influence treatment choice but do not influence potential outcomes, thus fulfilling an exclusion restriction. The causal implications of these so-called instrumental variable (IV) approaches in a nonparametric setting have been explored first by Imbens and Angrist (1994), Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996), and Heckman and Vytalacil (1999).¹³ Based on various types of exclusion

¹³ See Vytalacil (2002) for the proof that the control function approach, like in Heckman (1979), is – in a nonparametric sense – using the same assumptions as instrumental variables (IV) to achieve identification. The same is true for specific IV strategies called 'difference-in-differences' estimation (e.g. Meyer, 1995) or the regression discontinuity approach (e.g. Campbell and Stanley, 1963, and Hahn, Todd and van der Klaaw, 2001).

restrictions Miquel (2002, 2003) developed identification strategies for the dynamic causal model presented in the previous section. Ding and Lehrer (2003) apply these ideas in their empirical work.

The second group of nonparametric identification strategies also assumes the existence of an instrument, but does not require observing it. Instead, it supposes that all variables that jointly influence selection and outcome are observed (and the potentially unobserved instrument causes some additional variation of treatment status to be exploited). Thus, conditional on the values of these variables, called confounding variables in the statistics literature, we are in an experimental situation and we can learn the (unobservable) nontreatment outcomes of the treated from the (observable) nontreatment outcome of the nontreated and vice versa (Rubin, 1974, 1977). This assumption is called 'selection-on-observables' or conditional independence assumption (CIA) and gives rise to matching type estimators (see the excellent survey by Imbens, 2004). The current surge in the use of matching estimation is probably due to *better* data becoming available, in particular from government sources (e.g. Gerfin and Lechner, 2002, or Angrist, 1998). *Better* means more informative about outcome and selection variables as well as more observations. The additional information is crucial for making the identifying assumptions plausible, whereas a large number of observations permit application of nonparametric estimation approaches.

The database used in our empirical example falls in this category. In this case, substantial efforts have been made to compile these data from government sources with the particular intention of gathering selection information. Therefore, in the remainder of this section we explore the identifying power of two different versions of the selection on observables assumption in the dynamic context. We call them *dynamic conditional independence assumptions*, DCIA. Compared to the static approach, the major complication we address is that the outcomes of the treatments experienced so far may influence the variables used to correct for the selection effects.

4.2 Dynamic conditional independence assumptions

4.2.1 Weak dynamic conditional independence assumption (W-DCIA)

In LMW, we argue extensively that the data used in the empirical example is very rich in covariates (like socio-demographic variables, regional variables, employment histories, etc.). Therefore, it is likely to contain all (major) variables that *jointly* influence the selection process as well as the outcome variables, thus making CIA a credible assumption to identify causal effects in this context.¹⁴ ASSUMPTION 1 stating the WEAK DYNAMIC CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE ASSUMPTIONS (W-DCIA) formalises this idea using sequential statements about the conditional independence of outcomes and selection variables given the values of the confounders.¹⁵

*Assumption 1: Weak dynamic conditional independence assumption (W-DCIA)*¹⁶

- a) $Y_2^{00}, Y_2^{10}, Y_2^{01}, Y_2^{11} \perp\!\!\!\perp S_1 \mid X_0 = x_0;$
- b) $Y_2^{00}, Y_2^{10}, Y_2^{01}, Y_2^{11} \perp\!\!\!\perp S_2 \mid \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1;$
- c) $1 > P(S_1 = 1 \mid X_0 = x_0) > 0, \quad 1 > P(S_2 = 1 \mid \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1) > 0; \quad \forall \underline{x}_1 \in \underline{\mathcal{X}}_1, \quad \forall s_1 : s_1 \in \{0, 1\}.$

Part a) of ASSUMPTION 1 states that conditional on X_0 potential outcomes are independent of assignment in period 1 (S_1). This is the standard version of the static CIA. Part b) states that conditional on the treatment, on observable outcomes (which may be part of \underline{X}_1) and on confounding variables of period 0 and 1, \underline{X}_1 , potential outcomes are independent of participation in period 2 (S_2). To see whether such an

¹⁴ See LMW for an extensive discussion of the available variables, the institutional details underlying the selection process, the selection process itself, and the plausibility of the CIA.

¹⁵ The following assumptions relate to identification of all treatment effects defined in Section 2. If the desired comparison involves fewer potential outcomes, then the required changes will be obvious.

assumption is plausible in an application, we have to think about which variables influence *changes* in treatment status as well as outcomes. It is likely that time-varying confounders and the outcomes from the previous period play some role. For example, in our empirical example there are several variables relating to or derived from events that occur after the beginning of period 1 and before its end (like changes in claims to unemployment benefits, employment status, etc.). Thus, again, in this example, the assumption that we can control for the confounding variables that are related to treatment and selection in period 2 (given the treatment history) appears likely to hold. Note that ASSUMPTION 1 does not impose any further restrictions on X , in particular X_1 may be influenced by the treatment in period 1.

These assumptions are valid for all values of x_0 and x_1 in a given set $\underline{\mathcal{X}}_1$ for which we want to learn the effects. To make the necessary comparisons for all elements in this set, there must be a positive probability everywhere in this set to observe individuals in all relevant sequences. This assumption is formalised in part c) and usually called the *common support requirement* (CSR). THEOREM 1 shows that several interesting causal effects are identified.

Theorem 1: Identification based on W-DCIA

IF ASSUMPTION 1 holds, then $\theta_2^{\underline{s}_2^k : \underline{s}_2^l}, \theta_2^{\underline{s}_2^k : \underline{s}_2^l}(s_1^j)$ are identified, $\forall s_1^k, s_2^k, s_1^l, s_2^l, s_1^j, s_2^j \in \{0, 1\}$.

The proof of THEOREM 1 is given in Appendix A.2.¹⁷

¹⁶ $A \perp\!\!\!\perp B | C = c$ means that *each element* of the vector of random variables B is independent of the random variable A conditional on the random variable C taking a value of c in the sense of Dawid (1979). $A \perp\!\!\!\perp (B) | C = c$ means that the *joint distribution* of the elements of B is independent of A conditional on $C = c$.

¹⁷ Note that the assumption supposes conditional independence as opposed to conditional mean independence. Although the latter is sufficient for identification, the former has the virtue of being valid for all transformations of the dependent variable. Thus, it is very hard to construct plausible empirical examples for which the latter holds, but the former does not.

THEOREM 1 states that pair-wise comparisons of all sequences are identified, but only for groups of individuals defined by their treatment status in period 0 or 1 (like $\theta_2^{RR,TT}(\cdot)$ or $\theta_2^{RR,TT}(T)$; $\theta_2^{RR,TT}(TT)$ is not identified). The relevant distinction between the populations defined by treatment state in the first and subsequent periods is that in the first period, treatment choice is random conditional on exogenous variables, which is the result of the initial condition that $S_0 = 0$ holds for everybody. However, in the second period, randomisation into these treatments is conditional on variables already influenced by the first part of the treatment.

Although the appendix contains the formal proof of THEOREM 1, we use the empirical example to understand how to obtain identification. Suppose we are interested in $\theta_2^{TT,RR}(R)$. In this case, we identify $E(Y_2^{TT} | S_1 = R)$ and $E(Y_2^{RR} | S_1 = R)$ by applying ASSUMPTION 1, the law of iterated expectations (IE), and the observations rule (OR) given in equation (1):

$$\begin{aligned} E(Y_2^{RR} | S_1 = R) &\stackrel{IE}{=} E_{\underline{X}_1 | S_1 = R} E(Y_2^{RR} | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = R) \stackrel{A.1b}{=} E_{\underline{X}_1 | S_1 = R} E(Y_2^{RR} | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = RR) \\ &\stackrel{OR}{=} E_{\underline{X}_1 | S_1 = R} E(Y_2 | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = RR). \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} E(Y_2^{TT} | S_1 = R) &\stackrel{IE}{=} E_{X_0 | S_1 = R} E(Y_2^{TT} | X_0 = x_0, S_1 = R) \stackrel{A.1a}{=} E_{X_0 | S_1 = R} E(Y_2^{TT} | X_0 = x_0, S_1 = T) \\ &\stackrel{IE}{=} E_{(X_0 | S_1 = R)} E_{(X_1 | X_0, S_1 = T)} E(Y_2^{TT} | X_0 = x_0, X_1 = x_1, S_1 = T) \\ &\stackrel{A.1b}{=} E_{(X_0 | S_1 = R)} E_{(X_1 | X_0, S_1 = T)} E(Y_2^{TT} | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = TT) \\ &\stackrel{OR}{=} E_{(X_0 | S_1 = R)} E_{(X_1 | X_0, S_1 = T)} E(Y_2 | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = TT). \end{aligned}$$

This example shows how to reweigh the observations in TT and RR successively to learn the counterfactual outcome distribution of TT and RR for those in the target population of interest (R).¹⁸ Thus, the causal effects of interest can be expressed in terms of random variables for which realisations are observable:

$$\theta_2^{TT,RR}(R) = \underset{(X_0|S_1=R)}{E} \underset{(X_1|X_0,S_1=T)}{E} E(Y_2 | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = TT) - \underset{\underline{X}_1|S_1=R}{E} E(Y_2 | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = RR).$$

W-DCIA has an appeal for applied work as a natural extension of the static framework used so far. Based on W-DCIA additional parameters are identified using assumptions that are essentially not much more demanding than in the static case. Therefore, the result for the empirical example presented below will be based on this assumption.

4.2.2 Strong dynamic conditional independence assumption (S-DCIA)

Using our example again, it becomes apparent that ASSUMPTION 1 is not powerful (restrictive) enough to obtain a similar identification result for $\theta_2^{TT,RR}(TT)$, $\theta_2^{TT,RR}(RR)$, $\theta_2^{TT,RR}(TR)$, $\theta_2^{TT,RR}(RT)$:

$$E(Y_2^{TT} | \underline{S}_2 = RR) \stackrel{IE}{=} \underset{\underline{X}_1|\underline{S}_2=RR}{E} E(Y_2^{TT} | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = RR) \stackrel{A.1b}{=} \underset{\underline{X}_1|\underline{S}_2=RR}{E} E(Y_2^{TT} | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = R) = ?$$

The problem is that $E(Y_2^{TT} | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = R)$ cannot be rearranged to obtain an expression that is a function of the observable outcome (Y_2) only, because Y_2^{TT} is independent of S_1 conditional on X_0 , but not conditional on (X_0, X_1) . Nor is it independent of X_1 conditional on (S_1, X_0) , because X_1 contains part of the effect of S_1 on Y_2^{TT} . For $\theta_2^{TT,RR}(R)$ that did not matter, but for $\theta_2^{TT,RR}(RR)$ it does matter because X_1 determines the population of interest in the second period. If we are prepared to restrict this dependence, then all effects are identified. Therefore, in ASSUMPTION 2 we strengthen the 'exogeneity' requirement on the confounding variables with respect to S_1 .

¹⁸ The symbol above the equality sign denotes the assumption or the statistical property (IE: iterated expectations; OR: observation rule) used to derive the results on the right hand side of the equality sign.

Assumption 2: Strong dynamic conditional independence assumption (S-DCIA)

- a) $(Y_2^{11}, X_1), (Y_2^{10}, X_1), (Y_2^{01}, X_1), (Y_2^{00}, X_1) \perp\!\!\!\perp S_1 \mid X_0 = x_0.$
- b) Conditions b) and c) of Assumption 1 (W-DCIA) hold.

Note that ASSUMPTION 2a) implies ASSUMPTION 1a) (W-DCIA).

Theorem 2: Identification based on S-DCIA

If ASSUMPTION 2 is satisfied, then all treatment effects, $\theta_2^{\underline{s}_2^k; \underline{s}_2^l}, \theta_2^{\underline{s}_2^k; \underline{s}_2^l}(s_1^j), \theta_2^{\underline{s}_2^k; \underline{s}_2^l}(\underline{s}_2^j), \forall s_1^k, s_2^k, s_1^l, s_2^l, s_1^j, s_2^j \in \{0,1\}$, are identified.

The proof is given in Appendix A.3.

In our empirical example, part a) of ASSUMPTION 2 implies that $E(Y_2^{TT} \mid \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = R)$ does not de-

pend on S_1 : $E(Y_2^{TT} \mid \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = R) \stackrel{A.2a}{=} E(Y_2^{TT} \mid \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = T) \stackrel{A.1b}{=} E(Y_2^{TT} \mid \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = TT)$
 $\stackrel{OR}{=} E(Y_2 \mid \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = TT)$. Therefore, the desired counterfactual expectation is identified

$$E(Y_2^{TT} \mid \underline{S}_2 = RR) = \underset{\underline{X}_1 | \underline{S}_2 = RR}{E} E(Y_2 \mid \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = TT).$$

This is the same identification result as in the static multiple treatment model (see Lechner, 2001, 2002), where the treatments are defined as the sequences RR , RT , TR , and TT and (X_0, X_1) are the respective control variables. To understand the implication of the additional restrictions implied by S-DCIA note that ASSUMPTION 2a) implies $X_1 \perp\!\!\!\perp S_1 \mid X_0 = x_0$, i.e. $F(X_1 \mid X_0 = x_0, S_1 = 1) = F(X_1 \mid X_0 = x_0, S_1 = 0) = F(X_1 \mid X_0 = x_0)$, where $F(\cdot | \cdot)$ denotes a conditional cumulative distribution function. Since ASSUMPTION 2 is - at least partly - formulated in terms of observable random outcomes, its implication can be related to causality concepts in time series econometrics. It implies that the confounders are not

Granger-caused by previous treatments (Chamberlain, 1982). This condition is a testable implication of S-DCIA, which on the one hand is an advantage, but on the other hand suggests that S-DCIA may be stronger than strictly necessary.

4.3 *The endogeneity problem reconsidered*

In the previous section, we showed the various treatment effects can be identified by controlling for observable variables. It is interesting to note that for the identification result based on W-DCIA no explicit exogeneity condition was required for the control variables. This may appear to be surprising, because it is a well-known fact that if we include, for example, the outcome in the list of control variables, we will always estimate a zero effect (see Rosenbaum, 1984, Rubin, 2004, 2005, on this so-called endogeneity bias). As observed by Lechner (2005), a CIA based on observable control variables which are potentially influenced by the treatment is not the best representation of the identifying conditions, because it confounds selection effects with endogeneity issues. To see this, we use our example and look at the manipulations required to show identification:

$$E(Y_2^{TT} | X_0 = x_0, S_1 = R) \stackrel{A.1a}{=} E(Y_2^{TT} | X_0 = x_0, S_1 = T) \Rightarrow E(Y_2^{TT} | X_0^R = x_0, S_1 = R) \stackrel{A.1a}{=} E(Y_2^{TT} | X_0^T = x_0, S_1 = T) ;$$

$$E(Y_2^{TT} | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = T) \stackrel{A.1b}{=} E(Y_2 | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = TT) \Rightarrow E(Y_2^{TT} | \underline{X}_1^T = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = T) \stackrel{A.1b}{=} E(Y_2^{TT} | \underline{X}_1^{TT} = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = TT) .$$

Considering the relations to the right of the ‘ \Rightarrow ’ sign, it is clear that W-DCIA is in fact a set of joint assumptions about selection and endogeneity bias. To separate these issues, we reformulate the previous assumptions in terms of *potential* confounders that are by definition exogenous. Then, it becomes apparent what type of exogeneity assumptions are required to obtain identification without endogeneity bias.¹⁹ ASSUMPTION 3 gives the *weak conditional independence assumption* in terms of potential confounders (W-DCIA-P). It is formulated in a more compact notation to ease notational burden.

¹⁹ See Lechner (2005) for applying this line of thought to the static model.

Assumption 3: W-DCIA based on potential confounders (W-DCIA-P)

$$\text{a)} \quad Y_2^{\underline{s}_2} \perp\!\!\!\perp S_1 \mid X_0^{\underline{s}_2} = x_0;$$

$$\text{b)} \quad Y_2^{\underline{s}_2} \perp\!\!\!\perp S_2 \mid \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1;$$

$$\text{c)} \quad F(X_0^{\underline{s}_2} \mid S_1 = s_1^j) = F(X_0^{s_1^j} \mid S_1 = s_1^j);$$

$$F(X_1^{\underline{s}_1} \mid X_0^{\underline{s}_2} = x_0, S_1 = s_1) = F(X_1^{s_1} \mid X_0^{s_1} = x_0, S_1 = s_1); \quad \forall \underline{x}_1 \in \underline{\mathcal{X}}_1, \forall s_1, s_1^j, s_2 \in \{0,1\}.$$

Parts a) and b) are the same as before, now formulated in terms of potential confounders. The exogeneity conditions are given in part c). Intuitively, ASSUMPTION 3c) states that S_1 and S_2 should have no effect on confounders in period 0, and S_2 should have no effect on confounders in period 1. If we are willing to assume that the treatment has no effect on the confounders before it starts, i.e. $X_0^{\underline{s}_2} = X_0^1 = X_0^0$ and $X_1^{s_1,1} = X_1^{s_1,0}$, then ASSUMPTION 3c) holds. Such an assumption rules out anticipation effects (like reduced job search because people know they will participate in training in a few weeks from now).²⁰ Using our previous example, we show how to establish identification:

$$\begin{aligned} E(Y_2^{TT} \mid S_1 = R) &\stackrel{IE}{=} E_{X_0^{TT} \mid S_1 = R} E(Y_2^{TT} \mid X_0^{TT} = x_0, S_1 = R) \stackrel{A.3a}{=} E_{X_0^{TT} \mid S_1 = R} E(Y_2^{TT} \mid X_0^{TT} = x_0, S_1 = T) \\ &\stackrel{IE}{=} E_{(X_0^{TT} \mid S_1 = R)} E_{(X_1^{TT} \mid X_0^{TT}, S_1 = T)} E(Y_2^{TT} \mid X_0^{TT} = x_0, X_1^{TT}, S_1 = T) \\ &\stackrel{A.3b, OR}{=} E_{(X_0^{TT} \mid S_1 = R)} E_{(X_1^{TT} \mid X_0^{TT}, S_1 = T)} E(Y_2^{TT} \mid \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = TT) \\ &\stackrel{A.3c, OR}{=} E_{(X_0 \mid S_1 = R)} E_{(X_1 \mid X_0, S_1 = T)} E(Y_2 \mid \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = TT). \end{aligned}$$

THEOREM 3 shows that the intuition that we get from our example is indeed generally valid.

²⁰ See Abbring and van den Berg (2003) for a similar assumption in a duration framework, as well as the discussion in Section 3 about Robins' consistency condition.

Theorem 3: Identification based on W-DCIA-P

If ASSUMPTIONS 1c (CSR) and 3 hold, then $\theta_2^{\underline{s}_2^k; \underline{s}_2^l}$ and $\theta_2^{\underline{s}_2^k; \underline{s}_2^l}(s_1^j)$ are identified.

The proof is given in Appendix A.4.

The next step is to consider the S-DCIA in terms of potential outcomes. As expected, the exogeneity condition goes considerably beyond the requirements for W-DCIA-P. ASSUMPTION 4 gives the necessary conditions.

Assumption 4: S-DCIA based on potential confounders (S-DCIA-P)

$$\text{a)} \quad (Y_2^{\underline{s}_2}, X_1^{\underline{s}_2}) \amalg S_1 \mid X_0^{\underline{s}_2} = x_0.$$

$$\text{b)} \quad Y_2^{\underline{s}_2} \amalg S_2 \mid \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^j;$$

$$\text{c)} \quad F(X_0^{\underline{s}_2} \mid \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) = F(X_0^{\underline{s}_2^j} \mid \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j);$$

$$F(X_1^{\underline{s}_2} \mid X_0^{\underline{s}_2} = x_0, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) = F(X_1^{\underline{s}_2^j} \mid X_0^{\underline{s}_2^j} = x_0, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j); \quad \forall \underline{x}_1 \in \underline{\mathcal{X}}_1, \quad \forall s_1, s_1^j, s_2, s_2^j \in \{0, 1\}.$$

Note that ASSUMPTIONS 4a) and b) imply conditions a) and b) of ASSUMPTION 3 (W-DIA-P). A further implication is that the potential confounders are independent of assignment in period 1 ($X_1^{\underline{s}_2} \amalg S_1 \mid X_0^{\underline{s}_2} = x_0$), which is untestable. ASSUMPTION 4c) states the necessary exogeneity conditions. Intuitively, the most important additional assumption is that conditional on treatment status in all periods and on potential confounders in period 0, S_1 shall not influence X_1 . This assumption goes much beyond the no-anticipation condition required for W-DCIA-P by ruling out the use of intermediate outcomes as conditioning variables. Since there is no need to discuss identification for the example again - the argument is very similar to the ones used before - we immediately present the general results in THEOREM 4.

Theorem 4: Identification based on S-DCIA-P

If ASSUMPTIONS 1c (CSR) and 4 hold, then all effects are identified.

The proof is given in Appendix A.5.

4.4 The relation of the assumptions and their relevance in the empirical example

Finally, there is the issue on how the various assumptions are related. First, each S-DCIA is specified such that it immediately implies the corresponding W-DCIA. Next, we compare the W-DCIA and S-DCIA in terms of observable confounders to the formulations in terms of unobservable confounders. COROLLARIES 1 and 2 point out that they are related but neither implies the other without additional assumptions.²¹ The corresponding DCIA assumptions are equivalent only when additional exogeneity conditions are added to both sets of assumption. The exact conditions and proofs of equivalence are given in Appendix B. Intuitively, they imply that if the sources of endogeneity for the control variables do not influence various conditional expectations of the outcome variables, then W-CIA and W-CIA-P are essentially equivalent, as well as S-DCIA and S-DCIA-P.

What do these assumptions imply for our empirical example? S-DCIA is only plausible, if the time-varying confounding variables are not influenced by the evolvement of the treatment over time. Clearly, considering the types of confounders used and required in our application, this assumption is not plausible at all. However, in cases where the new information X_1 does influence outcomes as well as the choice of treatment in the next period, and this new information comes as a surprise (or at least is not influenced by the evolvement of the treatment history so far), then S-DCIA may be plausible and a very powerful assumption. This assumption is of course very convenient in applications, because estimation can be performed as in the usual static multiple treatment evaluations.

²¹ This may seem a bit surprising, because the S-DCIA implies a testable implication, whereas S-DCIA-P does not.

In our application W-DCIA appears to be plausible. It seems likely that all important variables that influence selection are observed. Furthermore, although intermediate outcomes play a role as potentially confounding variables, it appears likely that the unemployed does not react prior to the participation decision, as long as the date of the referral to the programmes and the starting date of the programme (which is the variable that must be used at the beginning of the programme, since referral is unobserved) are sufficiently close. Thus, it appears to be plausible that the exogeneity condition required for W-DCIA is fulfilled as well.

5 A note on estimation

5.1 Structure of the estimation problem

An in-depth discussion of estimation and inference in complex dynamic treatment studies using ASSUMPTIONS W-DCIA and S-DCIA is beyond the scope of this paper for reasons of space. We confine ourselves to brief considerations about how to use the sample information to obtain consistent estimators for the causal effects. We discuss the estimation of the causal effects for the different populations in turn.²²

When interest is in DATE, i.e. the average effect for the population $S_0 = 0$, W-DCIA and W-DCIA-P are sufficient for identification. Using the previous arguments, we obtain the following relation between the expected observable and expected potential outcomes:

$$E(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k}) = E_{X_0} E_{(X_1|X_0=\underline{x}_0, S_1=s_1^k)} E(Y_2 | X_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k); \quad s_1^k, s_2^k \in \{0,1\}. \quad (3)$$

This is exactly the so-called *G-computation algorithm* proposed by Robins (1986).

The estimation problem is such that suitably modified matching or other nonparametric regression methods which are popular estimators in the static causal model can be used here as well. In a first stage, a

²² For the sake of brevity, this paper concentrates on linking the observable random variables to the causal effects. An in-depth discussion of estimators would considerably extend an already long paper. Therefore, readers who are

regression of Y_2 on \underline{X}_1 in the subsample of $\underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k$ is performed, obtaining $E(Y_2 | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k)$.

Within each stratum of X_0 in the subpopulation $S_1 = s_1^k$, this regression function is averaged according to the distribution of X_1 in each such stratum. These averages are functions of X_0 only. Finally, this function is averaged over the distribution of X_0 in the population ($S_0 = 0$) leading to a sequential matching estimator. If we are willing to parametrise the respective conditional distributions, the various parametric or semiparametric estimation methods proposed by Robins and co-authors are a relevant alternative.

Next consider the DATET for the population defined by treatment in period 1 and identified by W-DCIA.

The estimand is given by the following equation (4):

$$E(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j) = \underset{(X_0 | S_1 = s_1^j)}{E} \underset{(X_1 | X_0 = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)}{E} E(Y_2 | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k); \quad s_1^k, s_2^k, s_1^j \in \{0, 1\}. \quad (4)$$

The previous estimation principles of the sequential matching type apply here as well. However, in the

first step, the averaging of $\underset{(X_1 | X_0 = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)}{E} E(Y_2 | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k)$ is with respect to the distribution of X_0

in $S_1 = s_1^j$.

Finally, consider the DATET defined by the full treatment sequences, which are only identified by the S-DCIA's, as well as alternative expression for the other effects that are valid under S-DCIA only. The estimand has the following structure given by equation (5):

$$E(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) = \underset{X_1, X_0 | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j}{E} E(Y_2 | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k);$$

$$E(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j) = \underset{X_1, X_0 | S_1 = s_1^j}{E} E(Y_2 | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k); \quad (5)$$

$$E(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k}) = \underset{X_1, X_0}{E} E(Y_2 | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k); \quad s_1^k, s_2^k, s_1^j, s_2^j \in \{0, 1\}.$$

interested in the properties of actual estimation methods that may be implemented in this framework are referred

Apparently, this estimation problem is the same as the typical static estimation problem based on the CIA. The only difference is that it is of the multiple treatment type, because four different sequences are involved (00, 01, 10, 11). For this framework several authors including Brodaty, Crépon, and Fougère (2001), Imbens (2000), and Lechner (2001, 2002) discuss issues of non- and semiparametric estimation. Of course, the estimators consistent under W-DCIA are consistent under S-DCIA as well.

5.2 *Balancing scores*

Nonparametric estimation of the estimands defined in equations (4) to (5) is subject to the curse of dimensionality problem. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and the extension to multiple treatments in Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) it is common practise in the static evaluation literature to 'solve' this problem by first estimating the participation probability conditional on the confounders, and then use the estimated conditional participation probability (the propensity score) instead of the confounders as conditioning variables. Propensity score properties are available here as well. For equation (5), they are identical to the static case and can be derived in a straightforward way. Since estimation based on S-DCIA is essentially a static multiple treatment problem, the balancing scores provided by Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) are directly applicable. The case of equation (4) is more complicated, because more than one propensity score is required. LEMMA 1 provides the necessary conditions.

Lemma 1: Balancing score property for W-DCIA

ASSUMPTION 1 is satisfied.

a) $Y_2^{00}, Y_2^{10}, Y_2^{01}, Y_2^{11} \perp\!\!\!\perp S_1 \mid b_1(X_0) = b_1(x_0)$ holds for all $b_1(x_0)$ such that

$$E[p_1(x_0) \mid b_1(X_0) = b_1(x_0)] = p_1(x_0) \text{ with } p_1(x_0) := P(S_1 = 1 \mid X_0 = x_0).$$

b) $Y_2^{00}, Y_2^{10}, Y_2^{01}, Y_2^{11} \perp\!\!\!\perp S_2 \mid b_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1) = b_2(\underline{x}_1, s_1)$ holds for all $b_2(\underline{x}_1, s_1)$ such that

$$E[p_2(\underline{x}_1, s_1) \mid b_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1) = b_2(\underline{x}_1, s_1)] = p_2(\underline{x}_1, s_1) \text{ with } p_2(\underline{x}_1, s_1) := P(S_2 = 1 \mid \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1).$$

to Lechner (2004). This paper contains an exact description of the estimator used in the application below.

The proof is given in Appendix A.6.

THEOREM 5 shows that matching can be performed in the respective subsample given by the treatment status using the conditional choice probabilities for the state in the next period. Note that the extension to the estimation of DATE is straightforward and does not need explicit consideration.

Theorem 5: Identification based on balancing score property for W-DCIA and W-DCIA-P

If ASSUMPTION 1 or ASSUMPTIONS 1c and 3 hold, then:

$$F(Y_2^k | S_1 = s_1^j) = \frac{E_{(p_1(X_0) | S_1 = s_1^j)}}{E_{(p_2(\underline{X}_1, s_1^k) | S_1 = s_1^k, p_1(X_0))}} [F(Y_2 | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k, \underline{p}_2(\underline{X}_1, s_1^k))], \quad s_1^k, s_2^k, s_1^j \in \{0, 1\} \quad (6)$$

The proof is given in Appendix A.7.

6 Empirical results

In this section, we assume that W-DCIA is valid and use the matching estimator extensively discussed in Lechner (2004), to estimate the causal effects of the treatment sequences discussed in Section 2 of this paper. The estimator is based on the result obtained in THEOREM 5 and uses a sequential one-to-one matching algorithm based on propensity scores. The target populations are defined by the states in period one (R, T, or U). Individuals in those target populations who find no suitably close match in the subsequent comparisons in terms of the respective propensity scores are deleted (common support).

Table 4 contains the results of the estimation. Column (1) shows the treatment sequences for which we estimate an effect. Since the effects may vary across the population in an arbitrary way, column (2) gives the population to which the respective effect relates (*target population*). The next column contains the number of observations in the groups of the two treatment sequences as well as in the target population. The number of deleted observations when imposing the common support condition adjusts the latter number. Columns (4) and (6) give the means of the outcome variables (employed after two and four years) for these three different subsamples (treated, comparison, target). For each comparison, the first two lines in

columns (8) and (10) contain the estimate for the respective counterfactual mean, whereas the third row contains the estimate of the causal effect, i.e. the parameter of interest. Therefore, comparing the first two lines in columns (4) and (6) to the first two lines in columns (8) and (10) gives us an indication of the amount of selection bias that the matching estimator is adjusting. Columns (5), (7), (9) and (11) present the standard errors for the estimators used.

----- Table 4 about here -----

Note that the samples of participants are small since this application with four periods and three treatments per period is rather demanding, because it generates up to 81 different possible sequences and related subsamples. Nevertheless, only the first comparison of one year of training compared to one year of unemployment lead to insignificant effects. For all other comparisons, at least the effects after four years are large enough to be determined. Comparing retraining to staying unemployed, we find that after two years there is no significant difference in the labour market outcomes. However, after four years we find about a 35%-point gain in employment chances for participating in retraining rather than remaining unemployed that may well be explained by the human capital effects of retraining and by stigma effects of remaining unemployed for a year. Note that this effect is about three times as large as the findings by LMW. However, they estimated the effect of starting retraining compared to remaining unemployed. For such a long programme as retraining, the most important difference between the two approaches is that, here, the counterfactual state of unemployment requires remaining unemployed for one year. In the potential states compared by LMW, the unemployed as well as retrainees are allowed to accept job offers immediately after the start (close to comparison of R against T in our notation). Therefore, the effect must be smaller because the unemployed will accept job offers while the retrainees are locked in their programme. This argument applies here only after one year. This example shows that the dynamic treatment approach can be used to define a wealth of parameters that are of interest in policy analysis. Here, because this is a methodological paper, we present only one specific type.

Finally, there is the comparison between training and retraining. It appears that training leads to much quicker integration into the labour market than retraining, whereas after some years the extensive and

expensive addition of human capital that is the core concept of retraining leads to considerably higher employment rates. Taking into account sampling uncertainty, these findings seem to hold for beginners of training as well as retraining.

7 Conclusion

In this paper we take up a topic that has been addressed in epidemiology 20 years ago by the seminal work of Robins (1986), namely the issue of how to identify the effect of sequential interventions.

We suggest approaching the problem of an econometric evaluation (a causal analysis) of dynamic programme sequences from a potential outcome perspective. We discuss the identifying power of different stylised assumptions about the connection between the dynamic selection process and the potential outcomes of the different sequences of programmes. These assumptions invoke different sorts of randomisation which are compatible with different types of selection and outcome regimes. All assumptions are framed in such a way that they need to be, and potentially can be, justified by sufficient knowledge about the selection and outcome process in conjunction with sufficiently rich panel data. Parametric forms are not involved. Participation in the sequences is cumulative in the sense that the decision concerning what programme to participate in in the next period depends on the outcomes of the part of the sequence that has already been completed. These types of so-called dynamic treatment regimes are for example prototypical for the selection mechanism in many European and North American labour market programmes. They are also an inherent problem in many economic policy analyses. However, due to the endogeneity problem of selection on outcomes of past treatments, not all parameters of interest are identified, if no additional assumptions are imposed on the connection between intermediate outcomes and the selection process. We show that although several types of dynamic versions of the average treatment effects on the treated are not identified in this case, dynamic versions similar to the average treatment effect for some broader population are identified. Our empirical example shows that these methods can be a useful tool in applied work.

Some parts of this paper are closely related to the work by Robins and co-authors, in particular the idea of specifying the weak dynamic conditional assumption in terms of sequential conditional randomisation conditional on the observed history of the various stochastic processes. Our main contribution for this part is (merely) that of translating the notation and language used in his papers to a language common in the econometric treatment evaluation literature and making some of the underlying behavioural assumptions explicit. Furthermore, we extend his approach in several dimensions: First, we discuss the identification of parameters other than the average treatment effect for the population and show that different assumptions about the nature of the dynamic selection problem are required for different effects that are usually of interest in applied studies. The differences concerning the behavioural implications of the different assumptions are substantial. In fact, identification of average treatment effects requires much less restrictive assumptions than the identification of average treatment effects on the treated. Second, we add an explicit discussion about the effects of endogeneity of the conditioning variables, as well as the issue of anticipation of future treatments, by respecifying the identifying assumptions in such a way that these issues can be addressed directly. Furthermore, we provide dimension-reducing devices along the line of the balancing scores introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) that allow for non- or semiparametric matching estimation of the parameters of interest. We give a brief outline of the structure of these estimators.

References

- Abbring, J.H. (2003): "Dynamic Econometric Program Evaluation", IZA, Discussion Paper, 804.
- Abbring, J.H. and G. van den Berg (2003): "The Nonparametric Identification of Treatment Effects in Duration Models", *Econometrica*, 71, 1491-1517.
- Angrist, J.D. (1998): "Estimating Labor Market Impact of Voluntary Military Service Using Social Security Data", *Econometrica*, 66, 249-288.
- Angrist, J.D., G.W. Imbens and D.B. Rubin (1996): "Identification of Causal Effects Using Instrumental Variables", *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 91, 444-472.
- Behrman, J., P. Sengupta and P. Todd (2005): "Progressing through PROGRESA: An Impact Assessment of a School Subsidy Experiment in Mexico", forthcoming in *Economic Development and Cultural Change*.
- Behrman, J., Y. Cheng and P. Todd (2004): "Evaluating Preschool Programs when Length of Exposure to the Program varies: A Nonparametric Approach", *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 86, 108-132.

- Bergemann, A., B. Fitzenberger and S. Speckesser (2004): "Evaluating the Dynamic Employment Effects of Training Programs in East Germany using Conditional Difference-in-Differences", ZEW, Discussion Paper 04-41.
- Brodsky, T., B. Crepon and D. Fougère (2001): "Using matching estimators to evaluate alternative youth employment programmes: Evidence from France, 1986-1988", in M. Lechner and F. Pfeiffer (eds.), *Econometric Evaluation of Labour Market Policies*, Heidelberg: Physica, 85-123.
- Cameron, C. A. and P. K. Trivedi (2005), *Microeconometrics*, Chapter 25, Cambridge: CUP.
- Campbell, D. and J. Stanley (1963): "Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for research on teaching", in: N. Gage (ed.), *Handbook of research on teaching*, Rand McNally, Chicago, 171-246.
- Chamberlain, G. (1982): "The General Equivalence of Granger and Sims Causality", *Econometrica*, 50, 569-581.
- Chamberlain, G. (1987): "Asymptotic Efficiency in Estimation with Conditional Moment Restrictions", *Journal of Econometrics*, 34, 305-334.
- Chamberlain, G. (1992): "Comment: Sequential Moment Restrictions in Panel Data", *Journal of Business & Economic Statistics*, 10, 20-26.
- Crépon, B. and F. Kramarz (2002): "Employed 40 hours or Not-Employed 39: Lessons from the 1982 Workweek Reduction in France", *Journal of Political Economy*, 110, 1355-1389.
- Cochran, W.G. and S.P. Chambers (1965): "The Planning of Observational Studies of Human Population", *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A (general)*, 128, 234-266.
- Dawid, A.P. (1979): "Conditional Independence in Statistical Theory", *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B*, 41, 1-31.
- Ding, W. and S.F. Lehrer (2003): "Estimating Dynamic Treatment Effects from Project STAR", mimeo.
- Gill, R.D. and J.M. Robins (2001): "Causal Inference for Complex Longitudinal Data: the Continuous Case", *Annals of Statistics*, 29, 1785-1811.
- Gerfin, M. and M. Lechner (2002): "Microeconomic Evaluation of the Active Labour Market Policy in Switzerland", *The Economic Journal*, 112, 854-893.
- Hahn, J., P. Todd and W. van der Klaaw (2001): "Identification and Estimation of Treatment Effects Using a Regression Discontinuity Design", *Econometrica*, 69, 201-209.
- Heckman, J. J. (1979): "Sample Selection as a Specification Error", 47, *Econometrica*, 153-161.
- Heckman, J.J., R.J. LaLonde and J. A. Smith (1999): "The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Market Programs", in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), *Handbook of Labor Economics*, Vol. III A, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1865-2097.
- Heckman, J.J. and R. Robb (1985): "Alternative Methods of Evaluating the Impact of Interventions", in: J.J. Heckman and B. Singer (eds.), *Longitudinal Analysis of Labour Market Data*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 156-245.
- Heckman, J.J. and E. Vytlacil (1999): "Local Instrumental Variables and Latent Variable Models for Identifying and Bounding Treatment Effects", *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science*, April 13, 1999.

- Heckman, J.J. and E. Vytlacil (2006): "Econometric Evaluation of Social Programs", forthcoming in J. J. Heckman and E. Leamer (eds.), *Handbook of Econometrics*, Vol. VI, North-Holland: Amsterdam.
- Imbens, G.W. (2000): "The Role of the Propensity Score in Estimating Dose-Response Functions", *Biometrika*, 87, 706-710.
- Imbens, G.W. (2004): "Nonparametric Estimation of Average Treatment Effects Under Exogeneity: A Review", *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 86, 4-29.
- Imbens, G.W. and J.D. Angrist (1994): "Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects", *Econometrica*, 62, 446-475.
- Lechner, M. (1999): "Earnings and Employment Effects of Continuous Off-the-job Training in East Germany after Unification", *Journal of Business & Economic Statistics*, 17, 74-90.
- Lechner, M. (2001): "Identification and estimation of causal effects of multiple treatments under the conditional independence assumption", in M. Lechner and F. Pfeiffer (eds.), *Econometric Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policies*, Heidelberg: Physica, 43-58.
- Lechner, M. (2002): "Programme Heterogeneity and Propensity Score Matching: An Application to the Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policies", *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 84, 205-220.
- Lechner, M. (2004): "Sequential Matching Estimation of Dynamic Causal Models", University of St. Gallen, Discussion paper, 2004-06.
- Lechner, M. (2005): "A Note on Endogenous Control Variables in Evaluation Studies", mimeo.
- Lechner, M., R. Miquel and C. Wunsch (2005): "Long - Run Effects of Public Sector - Sponsor Training in West Germany", IAB, Discussion Paper n° 3/2005.
- Manski, C.F. (2004): "Social learning From Private Experiences: The Dynamics of the Selection Problem", *Journal of Economics Studies*, 71, 443-558.
- Meyer, B.M. (1995): "Natural and Quasi-Experiments in Economics", *Journal of Business & Economic Statistics*, 13, 151-161.
- Miquel, R. (2002): "Identification of Dynamic Treatments Effects by Instrumental Variables", University of St. Gallen, Discussion paper, 2002-11.
- Miquel, R. (2003): "Identification of Effects of Dynamic Treatments with a Difference-in-Differences Approach", University of St. Gallen, Discussion paper, 2003-06.
- Murphy, S.A. (2003): "Optimal Dynamic Treatment Regimes", *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B*, 65, 331-366.
- Neyman, J. (1923): "On the Application of Probability Theory to Agricultural Experiments. Essay on Principles. Section 9", translated in *Statistical Science* (with discussion), 1990, 5, 465-480.
- Robins, J.M. (1986): "A new approach to causal inference in mortality studies with sustained exposure periods - Application to control of the healthy worker survivor effect." *Mathematical Modelling*, 7, 1393-1512, with 1987 Errata to "A new approach to causal inference in mortality studies with sustained exposure periods - Application to control of the healthy worker survivor effect." *Computers and Mathematics with Applications*, 14, 917-921;

- 1987 Addendum to "A new approach to causal inference in mortality studies with sustained exposure periods - Application to control of the healthy worker survivor effect", *Computers and Mathematics with Applications*, 14, 923-945; and 1987 Errata to "Addendum to 'A new approach to causal inference in mortality studies with sustained exposure periods - Application to control of the healthy worker survivor effect'." *Computers and Mathematics with Applications*, 18, 477.
- Robins, J.M. (1989): "The Analysis of Randomized and Nonrandomized AIDS Treatment Trials Using a New Approach to Causal Inference in Longitudinal Studies", Sechrest, L., H. Freeman, A. Mulley (eds.), *Health Service Research Methodology: A Focus on Aids*, 113-159, Washington, D.C., Public Health Service, National Center for Health Services Research.
- Robins, J.M. (1997): "Causal Inference from Complex Longitudinal Data. Latent Variable Modelling and Applications to Causality", in M. Berkane, (ed.), *Lecture Notes in Statistics* (120), New York: Springer, 69-117.
- Robins, J. M. (1999): "Association, Causation, and Marginal Structural Models", *Synthese*, 121, 151-179.
- Robins, J.M., S. Greenland and F. Hu (1999a): "Estimation of the Causal Effect of a Time-varying Exposure on the Marginal Mean of a Repeated Binary Outcome", *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 94, 687-700.
- Robins, J.M., S. Greenland and F. Hu (1999b): "Estimation of the Causal Effect of a Time-varying Exposure on the Marginal Mean of a Repeated Binary Outcome: Rejoinder", *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 94, 708-712.
- Rosenbaum, P.R. (1984): "The Consequences of Adjustment for a Concomitant Variable That Has Been Affected by the Treatment", *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A*, 147, 656-666.
- Rosenbaum, P.R. and D.B. Rubin (1983): "The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects", *Biometrika*, 70, 41-50.
- Roy, A.D. (1951): "Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings", *Oxford Economic Papers*, 3, 135-146.
- Rubin, D.B. (1974): "Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and Nonrandomized Studies", *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 66, 688-701.
- Rubin, D.B. (1977): "Assignment to a Treatment Group on the Basis of a Covariate", *Journal of Educational Statistics*, 2, 1-26.
- Rubin, D.B. (2004): "Direct and Indirect Causal Effects via Potential Outcomes", *Scandinavian Journal of Statistics*, 31, 161-170.
- Rubin, D.B. (2005): "Causal Inference Using Potential Outcomes: Design, Modeling, Decisions", *Journal of the American Statistical Society*, 100, 322-331.
- Sianesi, B. (2004): "An evaluation of the Swedish System of active labour market programmes in the 1990s", *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 86, 133-155.
- Vytlačil, E. (2002): "Independence, Monotonicity and Latent Index Models: an Equivalence Result", *Econometrica*, 70, 331-341.
- Wilks, S.S. (1932): "On the distribution of statistics in samples from a normal population of two variables with matched sampling of one variable," *Metron*, 9, 87-126.

Appendix A: Proofs of the identification results

A.1 Useful lemmas

Before providing the proofs in Appendix A.2, we consider two lemmas that connect potential outcomes and treatment effects with different lengths of treatment sequence and conditioning sequences. These relations are interesting per se, but will be particularly helpful in simplifying the proofs contained in this appendix.

Lemma A.1: Connection of treatment effects defined for conditioning sets of different lengths

$$\theta_t^{s_1^k; \underline{s}_1^l}(s_1^j) = \theta_t^{s_1^k; \underline{s}_1^l}(s_1^j 1)P[\underline{S}_2 = (s_1^j 1) | S_1 = s_1^j] + \theta_t^{s_1^k; \underline{s}_1^l}(s_1^j 0)P[\underline{S}_2 = (s_1^j 0) | S_1 = s_1^j].$$

The proof is direct by applying the definitions of the treatment effect. Because treatments are observable,

$P[\underline{S}_2 = (s_1^j 1) | S_1 = s_1^j]$ and $P[\underline{S}_2 = (s_1^j 0) | S_1 = s_1^j]$ are identified.

Lemma A.2: Connection of treatment effects defined for treatments of different lengths

$$\theta_t^{s_1^k; s_1^l}(s_1^j) = \theta_t^{(s_1^k 1); (s_1^l 1)}(s_1^j 1)P[S_2 = 1 | S_1 = s_1^j] + \theta_t^{(s_1^k 0); (s_1^l 0)}(s_1^j 0)P[S_2 = 0 | S_1 = s_1^j].$$

For the proof of this lemma, consider the following relations:

$$\begin{aligned} E(Y_t^{s_1^k} | S_1 = s_1^j) &= E[S_2 Y_t^{(s_1^k 1)} | S_1 = s_1^j] + E[(1 - S_2) Y_t^{(s_1^k 0)} | S_1 = s_1^j] = \\ &= E[S_2 Y_t^{(s_1^k 1)} | S_2 = 1, S_1 = s_1^j]P(S_2 = 1 | S_1 = s_1^j) + E[(1 - S_2) Y_t^{(s_1^k 0)} | S_2 = 0, S_1 = s_1^j]P(S_2 = 0 | S_1 = s_1^j) \\ &= E[Y_t^{(s_1^k 1)} | S_2 = 1, S_1 = s_1^j]P(S_2 = 1 | S_1 = s_1^j) + E[Y_t^{(s_1^k 0)} | S_2 = 0, S_1 = s_1^j]P(S_2 = 0 | S_1 = s_1^j). \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

Using the result of equations (7) we obtain the desired results for the connection of $\theta_t^{s_1^k; s_1^l}(s_1^j)$ and $\theta_t^{s_1^k; \underline{s}_2^l}(\underline{s}_2^j)$. q.e.d.

A.2 Proof of Theorem 1

First note that ASSUMPTION 1 (W-DCIA) implies the following restrictions:²³

$$F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j, X_0 = x_0) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^k, X_0 = x_0); \quad (8)$$

$$F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j, \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j, S_2 = s_2^k, \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1). \quad (9)$$

We must show that $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j)$ is identified. Let us consider the starting point for the proof in detail. We relate $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j)$ to some function of the observable outcomes by sequentially applying equations (8) and (9) to conditional expectation versions of $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j)$:

$$\begin{aligned} F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j) &= E_{X_0 | S_1 = s_1^j} [F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^k, X_0 = x_0)]; \\ F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^k, X_0 = x_0) &= E_{X_1 | S_1 = s_1^k, X_0 = x_0} [F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^k, \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1)] \\ &= E_{X_1 | S_1 = s_1^k, X_0 = x_0} [F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k, \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1)]. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, we obtain the following term for the counterfactual distribution:

$$F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j) = E_{X_0 | S_1 = s_1^j} E_{X_1 | S_1 = s_1^k, X_0 = x_0} [F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k, \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1)] = E_{X_0 | S_1 = s_1^j} E_{X_1 | S_1 = s_1^k, X_0 = x_0} [F(Y_2 | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k, \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1)].$$

q.e.d.

A.3 Proof of Theorem 2

We show that $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j)$ is identified. If $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j)$ is identified for all values of j and k , then all treatment effects are identified, because cases where the conditioning set is less coarse as well as cases where the sequences considered are shorter are identified as well by the relations derived in LEMMAS A.1 and A.2.

$$\begin{aligned} F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) &= E_{\underline{X}_1 | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j} [F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j, \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1)] \\ &\stackrel{A.2b}{=} E_{\underline{X}_1 | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j} [F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j, \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1)] = E_{X_0, X_1 | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j} [F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j, X_0 = x_0, X_1 = x_1)]. \\ F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j, X_0 = x_0, X_1 = x_1) &= \frac{F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k}, X_1 | S_1 = s_1^j, X_0 = x_0)}{F(X_1 | S_1 = s_1^j, X_0 = x_0)} \\ &\stackrel{A.2a}{=} \frac{F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k}, X_1 | S_1 = s_1^k, X_0 = x_0)}{F(X_1 | S_1 = s_1^k, X_0 = x_0)} \end{aligned}$$

²³ Depending on whether the elements of the vector of random variables A are continuous or discrete or both, $F(A | B = b)$ denotes the distribution function, the probability mass function or a mixture of both, conditional on the event that the random variable B equals a fixed value b .

$$= F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^k, \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1)$$

$$\stackrel{A.2b}{=} F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^k, \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1) = \underset{\underline{X}_1 | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j}{E} [F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k, \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1)].$$

Therefore, $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) = \underset{\underline{X}_1 | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j}{E} [F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k, \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1)]$ and it is identified. q.e.d.

A.4 Proof of Theorem 3

We need to show that $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j)$ is identified. Following similar steps as for Theorem 1, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j) &= \underset{X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j}{E} F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j) \\ &\stackrel{A.3a}{=} \underset{X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j}{E} F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k) \\ &= \underset{(X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j)}{E} \underset{(X_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)}{E} F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, X_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_1, S_1 = s_1^k) \\ &\stackrel{A.3b}{=} \underset{(X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j)}{E} \underset{(X_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)}{E} F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k) \\ &= \underset{(X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j)}{E} \underset{(X_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)}{E} F(Y_2 | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k) \\ &\stackrel{A.3c}{=} \underset{(X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j)}{E} \underset{(X_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)}{E} F(Y_2 | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k) \\ &= \underset{(X_0 | S_1 = s_1^j)}{E} \underset{(X_1 | X_0 = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)}{E} F(Y_2 | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k). \end{aligned} \quad \text{q.e.d.}$$

A.5 Proof of Theorem 4

We need to show that $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j)$ is identified.

$$\begin{aligned} F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) &= \underset{\underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j}{E} F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) \\ &\stackrel{A.4b}{=} \underset{\underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j}{E} F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^j). \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= E_{\underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j} \frac{F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k}, X_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j)}{F(X_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j)} \\
&\stackrel{A.4a}{=} E_{\underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j} \frac{F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k}, X_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)}{F(X_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)} \\
&= E_{\underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j} F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k) \\
&\stackrel{A.4b}{=} E_{\underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j} F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k) \\
&\stackrel{A.4c}{=} E_{\underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^j} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j} F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k) = E_{\underline{X}_1 | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j} F(Y_2 | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2) . \quad \text{q.e.d.}
\end{aligned}$$

The last result follows from ASSUMPTION 4C, stating $F(X_0^{\underline{s}_2} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) = F(X_0^{\underline{s}_2^j} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j)$ and

$$\begin{aligned}
&F(X_1^{\underline{s}_2} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2} = x_0, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) = F(X_1^{\underline{s}_2^j} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^j} = x_0, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) . \text{ Since } F(X_1^{\underline{s}_2} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2} = x_0, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) \\
&F(X_0^{\underline{s}_2} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) = F(\underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) \text{ and } F(X_1^{\underline{s}_2^j} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^j} = x_0, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) = F(X_0^{\underline{s}_2^j} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) = \\
&F(\underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^j} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) , \text{ we get } F(\underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) = F(\underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^j} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j) .
\end{aligned}$$

A.6 Proof of Lemma 1

a) The claim of LEMMA 1a is that $P[S_1 = 1 | Y_2^{\underline{s}_2}, b_1(X_0)] = P[S_1 = 1 | b_1(X_0)]$ holds if $b_1(X_0)$ is chosen such that

$$E[p_1(X_0) | b_1(X_0)] = p_1(X_0) .$$

$$\begin{aligned}
P[S_1 = 1 | Y_2^{\underline{s}_2}, b_1(X_0)] &= E_{X_0 | Y_2^{\underline{s}_2}, b_1(X_0)} [P(S_1 = 1 | Y_2^{\underline{s}_2}, X_0)] \\
&\stackrel{A.1a}{=} E_{X_0 | Y_2^{\underline{s}_2}, b_1(X_0)} [P(S_1 = 1 | X_0 = x_0)] \\
&= P(S_1 = 1 | X_0 = x_0) .
\end{aligned}$$

Since $E[p_1(X_0) | b_1(X_0)] = p_1(X_0)$, conditioning on $Y_2^{\underline{s}_2}$ does not change the value of $P(S_1 = 1 | X_0)$, thus S_1 is independent of the potential outcomes $Y_2^{\underline{s}_2}$ given $b_1(X_0)$ if ASSUMPTION 1a holds. q.e.d.

b) The claim of LEMMA 1 is that $P[S_2 = 1 | Y_2^{\underline{s}_2}, b_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1)] = P[S_2 = 1 | b_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1)]$ holds if $b_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1)$ is chosen such

that $E[p_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1) | b_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1)] = p_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1)$.

$$\begin{aligned} P[S_2 = 1 | Y_2^{s_2}, b_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1)] &= \underset{\underline{X}_1, S_1 | Y_2^{s_2}, b_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1)}{E} [P(S_2 = 1 | Y_2^{s_2}, \underline{X}_1, S_1)] \\ &\stackrel{A.1b}{=} \underset{\underline{X}_1, S_1 | Y_2^{s_2}, b_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1)}{E} [P(S_2 = 1 | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, S_1)] \\ &= P(S_2 = 1 | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, S_1). \end{aligned}$$

Since $E[p_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1) | b_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1)] = p_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1)$, conditioning on $Y_2^{s_2}$ does not change the value of $P(S_2 = 1 | \underline{X}_1, S_1)$, thus S_2 is independent of the potential outcomes $Y_2^{s_2}$ given $b_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1)$ if ASSUMPTION 1b holds. q.e.d.

Note that the following functions fulfil the balancing requirements:

- a) $b_2^1(\underline{X}_1, S_1) := \underline{p}_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1)$ [because $E[p_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1) | p_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1), \underline{p}_1(X_0)] = p_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1)$]
- b) $b_2^2(\underline{X}_1, S_1) := [S_1, \underline{p}_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1)]$ [because $E[p_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1) | p_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1), S_1, \underline{p}_1(X_0)] = p_2(\underline{X}_1, S_1)$]

A.7 Proof of Theorem 5

First, note that LEMMA 1 implies the following restrictions:

$$F[Y_2^{s_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j, p_1(X_0)] = F[Y_2^{s_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^k, p_1(X_0)], \quad (10)$$

$$F[Y_2^{s_2^k} | S_2 = s_2^j, p_2(\underline{X}_1, s_1^j)] = F[Y_2^{s_2^k} | S_2 = s_2^k, p_2(\underline{X}_1, s_1^j)]. \quad (11)$$

Furthermore, LEMMA 1 implies that the same relation as in equation (11) holds for a finer conditioning set, like the ones given in the following two equations:

$$F[Y_2^{s_2^k} | S_2 = s_2^j, p_2(\underline{X}_1, s_1^j), p_1(X_0)] = F[Y_2^{s_2^k} | S_2 = s_2^k, \underline{p}_2(\underline{X}_1, s_1^j)], \quad (12)$$

$$F[Y_2^{s_2^k} | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^j, p_2(\underline{X}_1, s_1^j), p_1(X_0)] = F[Y_2^{s_2^k} | S_2 = s_2^k, S_1 = s_1^j, \underline{p}_2(\underline{X}_1, s_1^j)]. \quad (13)$$

We need to show that $F(Y_2^{s_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j)$ is identified. We relate $F(Y_2^{s_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j)$ to the observable outcomes by sequentially applying equations (10) and (13) to different conditional expectation versions of $F(Y_2^{s_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j)$:

$$F(Y_2^{s_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j) \stackrel{L.1}{=} \underset{p_1(X_0) | S_1 = s_1^j}{E} [F(Y_2^{s_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^k, p_1(X_0))];$$

$$\begin{aligned}
F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^k, p_1(X_0)) &= \underset{p_2(\underline{X}_1, s_1^k) | S_1 = s_1^k, p_1(X_0)}{E} [F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^k, \underline{p}_2(\underline{X}_1, s_1^k))] \\
&\stackrel{L.1}{=} \underset{p_2(\underline{X}_1, s_1^k) | S_1 = s_1^k, p_1(X_0)}{E} [F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_2 = s_2^k, S_1 = s_1^k, \underline{p}_2(\underline{X}_1, s_1^k))] \\
&= \underset{p_2(\underline{X}_1, s_1^k) | S_1 = s_1^k, p_1(X_0)}{E} [F(Y_2 | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k, \underline{p}_2(\underline{X}_1, s_1^k))] .
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, we obtain the following term for the counterfactual distribution:

$$F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | S_1 = s_1^j) = \underset{p_1(X_0) | S_1 = s_1^j}{E} \underset{p_2(\underline{X}_1, s_1^k) | S_1 = s_1^k, p_1(X_0)}{E} [F(Y_2 | \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k, \underline{p}_2(\underline{X}_1, s_1^k))] ,$$

and thus identification of $\theta_2^{\underline{s}_2^k; \underline{s}_2^j}$ and $\theta_2^{\underline{s}_2^k; \underline{s}_2^j}(s_1^j)$.

q.e.d.

Appendix B: The relation between DCIA and DCIA-P

Corollary B.1: (Analytical results for the relation between W-DCIA and W-DCIA-P)

- a) ASSUMPTION 3a, $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_1^j} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j)$ and $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_1^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)$ imply ASSUMPTION 1a.
- b) ASSUMPTION 3b and $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_1^j \underline{s}_2^j} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^j)$ imply ASSUMPTION 1b.
- c) ASSUMPTION 1a, $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_1^j} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j)$ and $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_1^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)$ imply ASSUMPTION 3a.
- d) ASSUMPTION 1b and $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_1^k \underline{s}_2^j} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^j)$ imply ASSUMPTION 3b.

Proof of Corollary B.1

- a) ASSUMPTION 3a implies that $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)$. This equality is equivalent to $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_1^j} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_1^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)$ under the two additional assumptions. Thus, $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0 = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0 = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)$ holds. q.e.d.

- b) ASSUMPTION 3b states that $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^k)$. The additional assumption implies that $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{s_1^k s_2^j} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^k)$, which is equivalent to $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k)$. q.e.d.
- c) ASSUMPTION 1a states that $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0 = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0 = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)$ which is equivalent to $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{s_1^j} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{s_1^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)$. This equality is equivalent to $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)$ under the two additional assumptions, as stated by ASSUMPTION 3a. q.e.d.
- d) ASSUMPTION 1b states that $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^j)$. Using the observation rule this equality is equivalent to $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{s_1^k s_2^j} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^j)$. The additional assumption implies the condition of ASSUMPTION 3b, namely $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^j)$. q.e.d.

Corollary B.2: Analytical results for the relation between S-DCIA and S-DCIA-P

- a) ASSUMPTION 4a, $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{s_1^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k)$, $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{s_1^j} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^j)$ and $F(X_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k) = F(X_1^{s_1^k} | X_0^{s_1^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)$, $F(X_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(X_1^{s_1^j} | X_0^{s_1^j} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j)$ imply ASSUMPTION 2a.
- b) ASSUMPTION 4b and $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{s_1^k s_2^j} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^j)$ imply ASSUMPTION 2b.
- c) ASSUMPTION 2a, $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{s_1^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k)$, $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{s_1^j} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j)$, and $F(X_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k) = F(X_1^{s_1^k} | X_0^{s_1^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)$, $F(X_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(X_1^{s_1^j} | X_0^{s_1^j} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j)$ imply ASSUMPTION 4a.
- d) ASSUMPTION 2b, $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{s_1^k s_2^j} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^j)$, $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^j, S_2 = s_2^k) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{s_1^j s_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^j, S_2 = s_2^k)$ and

$$F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_1^j} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^j, S_2 = s_2^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{s_1^k s_2^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^j, S_2 = s_2^j) \text{ imply ASSUMPTION 4b.}$$

Proof of Corollary B.2

- a) ASSUMPTION 4a implies $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_1^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_1^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k)$ and $F(X_1^{\underline{s}_1^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(X_1^{\underline{s}_1^k} | X_0^{\underline{s}_2^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)$. Under the additional assumptions, we have $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{s_1^j} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{s_1^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k)$ and $F(X_1^{s_1^j} | X_0^{s_1^j} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(X_1^{s_1^k} | X_0^{s_1^k} = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)$, which leads to the conditions of ASSUMPTION 2a, namely $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k)$, $F(X_1 | X_0 = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(X_1 | X_0 = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)$, thus $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k}, X_1 | X_0 = x_0, S_1 = s_1^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k}, X_1 | X_0 = x_0, S_1 = s_1^k)$.
- b) $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_1^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_1^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^k)$ holds under ASSUMPTION 4b. The additional assumption implies $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{s_1^k s_2^j} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1^{\underline{s}_1^k} = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^k)$, which is equivalent to $F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, S_1 = s_1^k, S_2 = s_2^j) = F(Y_2^{\underline{s}_2^k} | \underline{X}_1 = \underline{x}_1, \underline{S}_2 = \underline{s}_2^k)$, the condition of ASSUMPTION 2b.
- c), d) The proofs are similar to the proofs of a) and b) of COROLLARY B.1.

Figure 1: Notation and time line of the dynamic causal model




Table 1: Descriptive statistics for selected variables

Variables	Subpopulations	Means / shares in % in subsamples											
		U	T	R	UU	UUU	UUUU	TT	TTT	TTTT	RR	RRR	RRRR
Women		41	43	42	42	41	40	44	40	38	43	44	45
Age		38	33	30	40	42	43	33	33	33	30	30	30
Nationality: German		83	85	82	83	83	82	85	85	85	84	84	84
Nationality: Western European		9	5	5	10	10	11	5	5	7	4	3	4
At least one child		32	34	36	33	33	32	34	32	29	37	38	38
UE benefits in the month before the beginning of the period under consideration													
	before quarter 1	90	89	86	89	89	89	90	90	91	87	86	86
	before quarter 2	80	5	2	87	87	87	1	1	0	0	0	0
	before quarter 3	64	19	5	79	82	82	13	1	1	2	0	0
	before quarter 4	56	29	6	66	75	77	29	22	0	4	1	0
Last monthly earnings (in euros; mean of positive earnings)													
	before quarter 1	1902	1605	1524	1874	1978	2069	1612	1663	1753	1532	1529	1377
	before quarter 2	1846	1604	1517	1875	1978	2070	1611	1662	1756	1524	1520	1529
	before quarter 3	1789	1606	1510	1875	1978	2070	1607	1662	1756	1524	1520	1529
	before quarter 4	1792	1639	1512	1873	1976	2069	1646	1684	1756	1527	1519	1529
Remaining unemployment (UE) benefits claim in months													
	before quarter 1	9.5	4.0	3.1	10.6	11.5	12.3	4.5	4.7	4.5	3.2	3.2	3.2
	before quarter 2	6.7	6.3	5.8	8.1	9.0	9.8	7.0	6.9	7.2	5.9	5.8	5.8
	before quarter 3	5.3	5.7	5.8	5.8	6.8	7.6	6.1	7.1	7.3	6.0	6.0	6.0
	before quarter 4	4.4	5.2	6.1	4.4	5.0	5.8	5.6	6.2	7.6	6.4	6.4	6.5
Employment (1: employed)													
	24 month after the first unemployment spell	32	50	29	26	21	17	48	46	42	27	24	24
	48 month after the first unemployment spell	32	52	66	27	23	19	53	56	58	69	70	71
Sample Size		27332	494	174	19677	15417	12484	372	231	120	164	149	143

Note: See LMW and Table WWW.A.1 in the internet appendix for more details on the data.

Table 2: Estimated coefficients of sequential binary probit models for choice of state in the beginning of the different periods (selected variables only)

Variables	U vs. T	R vs. T	U vs. R	UU if U	UUU if UU	UUUU if UUU	TT if T	TTT if TT	TTTT if TTT	RR if R	RRR if RR	RRRR if RRR
	coeff	coeff.	coeff.	coeff.	coeff.	coeff.	coeff.	coeff.	coeff.	coeff.	coeff.	coeff.
Women	0.11	-0.05	<i>0.13</i>	0.02	-0.02	-0.10*	0.22	-0.23	0.23	0.55	0.26	0.24
Age/10	-0.99*	-0.06	-1.10*	-0.14	0.02	0.55*	1.16	0.33	2.83			
(Age/10)^2	0.14*	-0.04	0.19*	0.03	0.00	-0.06*	-0.18	-0.04	-0.34			
Younger than 26 years	-0.19	-0.58	0.27	-0.13*	<i>-0.10</i>	0.08	-0.30	-0.26	<i>1.05</i>			
Nationality: German	-0.04	-0.01	-0.14	-0.11*	-0.13*	-0.14*	0.11	0.11	-0.48			
Nationality: Western European	0.14	-0.19	0.38	-0.00	-0.06	<i>-0.15</i>						
At least one child	0.03	0.11	0.02	0.11*	0.02	0.01	-0.01	<i>-0.34</i>	-0.60			
Position in last job (reference category: skilled worker, Master craftsman)												
Salaried Employee	-0.22*	0.12	-0.21	0.07	-0.00	-0.01						
Part-time worker	-0.25*	-0.27	0.03	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02						
Unskilled worker	0.01	0.42	<i>-0.18</i>	0.10*	<i>0.06</i>	0.11*						
Unemployment and employment status before the beginning of the period under consideration: (reference categories: out-of-labor, missing)												
Unemployed in the 6th. month before beg.	0.05	0.37	-0.21	<i>0.11</i>	-0.03	-0.09	-0.34	0.09	-0.75			
12th. month before beg.	-0.08	0.00	-0.07	-0.11	-0.10	0.10	1.00*	-0.21	-1.88			
24th. month before beg.	-0.17	<i>-0.39</i>	0.15	-0.11	0.01	0.15	0.10	0.36	-0.90			
UE benefits in the month before the beginning of the period under consideration (reference category: UE assistance)												
before quarter 1	-0.73*	-0.06	-0.67*	-0.81*	-0.07	-0.05	-0.41	0.53	-0.26			
before quarter 2				0.92*	-0.26*	<i>0.19</i>						
before quarter 3					0.25*	-0.12						
before quarter 4						-0.25*						
Remaining unemployment (UE) benefits claim in months												
before quarter 1	0.05	-0.03	0.04	0.03*	0.12*	-0.06	-0.11	-0.31	0.48*	<i>0.10</i>		
before quarter 2				0.05*	0.04	-0.08	0.23*	-0.42	-0.88*		-0.02	
before quarter 3					-0.15*	0.22*		0.67*				0.06
before quarter 4						-0.00			0.49			

Note: Empty cell means that the respective variable is excluded from this equation. **Bold** numbers indicate significance at the 5% level, numbers in *italics* relate to the 10 % level and * to the 1 % level. The following variables are included in the estimates but omitted from this table: Constant term; education; last monthly earnings and missing information about earnings; various variables capturing future claim of unemployment; industrial sector, previous occupation before defining unemployment spell; firm size of employer; regional information; various historical un/ out-of/employment information before the "first unemployment period". The appendix contains a table with all variables included. The detailed results including asymptotic std. errors can be found in the internet appendix. All the results for unemployment are from the comparison with training.

Table 3: Summary of notation and definitions

Symbol	Meaning	Timing within period
$t = 0, 1, 2$	Time periods	--
$S = (0, S_1, S_2)$	RV: treatment	Beginning
$\underline{s}_1 = (0, s_1)$, $\underline{s}_2 = (0, s_1, s_2)$	Specific sequence of treatments until period 1 or 2	Beginning
$s_t \in \{0, 1\}$	2 exclusive treatments in each period	Beginning
$Y^{\underline{s}} = (Y_1^{\underline{s}}, Y_2^{\underline{s}})$	RV: potential outcomes	End
$Y = (Y_1, Y_2)$	RV: observable outcomes	End
$X^{\underline{s}} = (X_0^{\underline{s}}, X_1^{\underline{s}})$	RV: potential confounders	End
$X = (X_0, X_1)$	RV: observable confounders	End
$\theta_t^{\underline{s}_t^k, \underline{s}_t^l}(\underline{s}_t^j)$	mean causal effect of \underline{s}_t^k compared to \underline{s}_t^l for those participating in \underline{s}_t^j	End

RV: Random variable.

Table 4: Results of the dynamic matching estimation

Sequences \underline{s}_4^1 \underline{s}_4^0	Target pop. s_1	Sample size $N_{\underline{s}_4^1}$ $N_{\underline{s}_4^0}$ N_{s_1}	$E(Y_t \underline{s}_4 = \underline{s}_4^1)$ $E(Y_t \underline{s}_4 = \underline{s}_4^0)$ $E(Y_t S_1 = s_1)$				$E(Y_t^{\underline{s}_4^1} S_1 = s_1)$ $E(Y_t^{\underline{s}_4^0} S_1 = s_1)$ $\theta_t^{\underline{s}_4^0, \underline{s}_4^1}(s_1)$			
			ET24	(std)	ET48	(std)	ET24	(std)	ET48	(std)
			(%)		(%)		(%)		(%)	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
TTTT		120	41.7	(4.5)	58.3	(4.5)	28.5	(11.6)	35.7	(11)
UUUU		12484	16.5	(0.3)	19.5	(0.4)	22.9	(0.8)	27.4	(0.9)
	U	16600	33.9	(0.4)	34.3	(0.4)	5.6	(11.7)	8.2	(11)
TTTT		120	41.7	(4.5)	58.3	(4.5)	36.5	(6.7)	48.8	(6.7)
UUUU		12484	16.5	(0.3)	19.5	(0.4)	28.1	(3.2)	38.3	(3.5)
	T	334	51.2	(2.7)	55.3	(2.7)	8.4	(7.4)	10.5	(7.5)
RRRR		143	24.5	(3.6)	71.3	(3.8)	25.6	(6.9)	66.8	(7.3)
UUUU		12484	16.5	(0.3)	19.5	(0.4)	25.7	(1.0)	31.8	(1.1)
	U	19088	40.1	(0.4)	40.7	(0.4)	-0.2	(7.0)	35.0	(7.4)
RRRR		143	24.5	(3.6)	71.3	(3.8)	25.3	(3.9)	71.3	(4.1)
UUUU		12484	16.5	(0.3)	19.5	(0.4)	25.9	(3.8)	40.2	(4.3)
	R	174	28.7	(3.4)	66.1	(3.6)	-0.6	(5.5)	31.0	(6.0)
RRRR		143	24.5	(3.6)	71.3	(3.8)	13.9	(7.0)	73.2	(7.3)
TTTT		120	41.7	(4.5)	58.3	(4.5)	39.7	(6.3)	54.5	(6.3)
	T	325	52.6	(2.8)	56.0	(2.8)	-25.9	(9.5)	18.8	(9.7)
RRRR		143	24.5	(3.6)	71.3	(3.8)	24.6	(4.7)	72.1	(4.9)
TTTT		120	41.7	(4.5)	58.3	(4.5)	43.4	(9.8)	54.1	(9.8)
	R	122	29.5	(4.1)	63.9	(4.4)	-18.9	(10.9)	18.0	(11)

Note: ET24 = employed the 24th month after the first month of unemployment, ET48 = employed the 48th month after the first month of unemployment. **Bold** : Effect is significant at 1 level. *Italics*: Effect significant at 10% level. N_{s_1} is the sample size after imposing common support, $N_{\underline{s}_4^1}$ and $N_{\underline{s}_4^0}$ are the sample sizes before imposing common support.